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ABSTRACT 
In April 1998 the New Zealand government announced a reform package for 
the electricity industry. This package was designed to drum up the competition 
promised since deregulation first began in 1987. The 1998 reforms had two 
main aspects: firstly, the split of ECNZ, New Zealand's dominant SOE 
generator, into three competitive units; secondly, a rule that local power 
companies could not own both a lines business (the local distribution wires) 
and a generation or retail business ( "the ownership split''). 
The ownership split caused a revolution in the industry. Effectively, small 
community-owned companies were forced to sell their retail and generation 
businesses to larger companies or to the State, in the form of the ECNZ 
'babies '. The government believed that the ownership split would facilitate 
retail competition and deliver lower domestic power prices. This paper asks 
whether the government was right - whether the ownership split was necessary, 
or able, to reduce domestic power prices. 
This paper concludes that the ownership split was a staggering mistake. 
The government 's reasoning was based on inconclusive evidence, inadequate 
research and contained major logical flaws. The government rejected 
unanimous policy advice warning against the split. Since the split average 
domestic power prices have risen by almost 4 per cent. A major factor is the 
demise of community-owned supply companies which had offered unique 
advantages to consumers. 
The root of this disaster was ideological bias. The government did not 
understand the electricity industry but treated it as an abstract economic 
construct. This paper documents the way in which ideology led the government 
to wreak havoc on an industry in order to cure problems it basically dreamt up. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 15970 words. 
1ltt SPUTilN~ OF EC.NZ, ONE OF IBE Mosr EFF1,1~NT ELECTRICITY 
GENERATORS IN THE WOR~D. fNlO TWO COMPETIN~ . C.ROUPS HA~ 
RESUCfED IN Hl,H~ POWER PRICfS, YtT DESPITE THIS FAIL.URE 
1HE MINISTER Of fNER~Y INTENDS 10 PRESS AHf'AD w,TH 
PRIVATISATION ... 
Tom Scott I 9 October 1997 
:rosr e~cAOSf , 
!OMEllU~ DOESNT 
WORt(. fN PRACTICE , 
DO~S~T MEAN rT CANT 
WORK" I" 1\iEORY ... 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In April 1998, the New Zealand Government announced a reform package for 
the electricity industry, spearheaded by the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
1998 ("EIR Act"). 1 This package made several changes to the generation, 
distribution and retail sectors.2 The two most significant changes were effected 
by the EIR Act itself. The first was intended to increase generation competition 
by splitting ECNZ, New Zealand's dominant state-owned enterprise ("SOE") 
generator, into three smaller SOEs.3 The second was intended to increase retail 
competition by forcing local electricity companies to sell either their lines or 
their supply (that is, generation or retail) businesses by 2004 ("ownership 
split"). 4 
Other reform measures included strengthening the current information 
disclosure regulations; giving the industry twelve months to establish a low-cost 
system allowing domestic customers to switch retailers; threatening, but not 
implementing, price control for lines businesses; and tightening the valuation 
methodology for monopoly assets . 
These reforms were quickly implemented. The EIR Act was introduced on 19 
May 1998 and enacted on 8 July 1998. New disclosure regulations came into 
force on 29 April 1999. 5 The new switching system, called deemed profiling, 
1 Hon W Peters, Rt Hon B Birch, Hon M Bradford "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", 
Media Release, 7 April 1998 ["A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers"]. 
2 "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 1, 1-2. The only sector not affected was 
transmission. See page 4 below for a brief description of the different industry sectors. 
3 In 1998 ECNZ (the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand) owned 59% of New Zealand ' s 
installed capacity: Contact Energy "Investment Statement", 31 March 1999, 15. In 1997, 
ECNZ accounted for 70% of total electricity sales: Cabinet Committee on Industry and 
Environment "Electricity Reforms: Paper 2: Analysis of Problems", 1 December 1997, CIE (97) 
193, 3 ["Cabinet Committee Two"]. For the abbreviations of Government policy documents 
cited in this paper, see Appendix Four. 
4 A lines business is any business (apart from the national grid) that conveys more than 2.SGWh 
per annum of electricity by line: EIR Act, s 4. It is the distribution side of the industry (the 
terms 'lines ' and 'distribution' are used synonymously in this paper). A supply business is any 
business that sells or generates electricity: EIR Act, s 5; it is the production and retail side of the 
industry. 
5 Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1999. 
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was implemented on time on 1 April 1999;
6 a price control framework was 
developed in December 1998;7 and the new valuation handbook was published 
8 on 21 May 1999. 
But if the reforms came fast, the industry reaction was faster. Between July 
1998 and April 1999, New Zealand witnessed an incredible frenzy of activity. 
Every electricity company in the country was suddenly in a hurry to sell down 
or buy up or both. Many companies changed their name to rebrand themselves 
for the new era. Some kept the same name but changed their business or were 
taken over by a competitor. Government officials were left surprised 
everything had happened so fast; consumers were simply left confused. When 
the dust had settled, New Zealand had gone from having two major generators 
and 35 electricity lines/retail companies, to six major generation/retail 
companies and 31 lines companies. Almost overnight, New Zealand had a new 
electricity sector. 
Of all the reform measures, the measure behind this dramatic revolution was 
clearly the ownership split. The selling frenzy occurred because all electricity 
companies had to decide to either sell one business outright or chose a less 
viable compliance option by April 1999. 9 The official reason for the ownership 
spilt was a desire for increased domestic retail competition leading to lower 
domestic power prices. 10 The ownership split and its effect on domestic 
electricity consumers is therefore the subject of this paper. The two questions 
this paper asks is whether total separation was necessary for real domestic 
competition; and whether the new industry the split created is really better than 
the one it destroyed. 
6 Electricity Market Company "Choice at Last for Household Electricity Consumers", Media 
Release, I April 1999. 
7 Ministry of Commerce "Electricity Industry Reform: Discussion Paper on the Operation of the 
Specific Thresholds for Price Control for Electricity Line Businesses" (Ministry of Commerce, 
Wellington, December 1998) [The Ministry is hereafter referred to simply as "Commerce"]. 
8 Commerce "Handbook for Optimised Deprival Valuation of System Fixed Assets of 
flectricity Line Businesses" (Commerce, Wellington, 21 May 1999). 
For details of the options under the EIR Act, see Part IV. 
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The paper concludes that the answer to both questions is an emphatic "No". 
This conclusion is not possible only in hindsight, but was obvious back in April 
1998. The decision to split power companies was based on inadequate 
research, rejected key advice, and was logically flawed. In practice, the split 
achieved nothing. The retail competition sought has come about for quite 
different reasons - namely new technology and the four SOE generators 
moving into the retail market. The only legacy of the split is the significant 
damage it has caused. In particular this damage has been borne by customers of 
the most popular form of electricity company - a community-owned company -
which operated mainly in provincial and rural regions. 11 This paper focuses 
closely on the effect of the split on such companies. 
The reasoning behind the ownership split reveals the triumph of pure ideology 
over common sense. Quite clearly, the government did not understand the 
complexities of a unique industry. This paper argues that ownership separation 
was regulation straight out of a fifth-form economics textbook. 
Structurally, this paper is divided into seven main parts. The first four are 
factual. Parts II and III respectively outline the background to the 1998 reforms 
to indicate the policy problem the ownership split was intended to solve; and 
then delve into the official analysis of this policy problem and the government's 
response to that advice. Part IV details the EIR Act and the industry response 
to it. Part V provides perspective by examining the way other, similarly placed, 
countries have dealt with the same policy problem. 
The next three parts are analytical. Part VI points out the mistakes made by 
government and how they arose. It alleges the split was made with insufficient 
evidence; was based on flawed reasoning; and resulted in a dysfunctional 
industry. Part VII highlights the problems caused through a case study of an 
area whose electricity supplier, Marlborough Electric Ltd, was taken to the 
10 "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n I, I; Hon W Peters, Hon M Bradford 
"Electricity Distribution and Retail Reforms", Media Release, 7 April 1998, I ["Electricity 
Distribution and Retail Reforms"]. 
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Court of Appeal by a resident earlier this year. Finally, Part VIII discusses the 
deeper conclusions underlying this unfortunate saga. 
II THE OWNERSIDP SPLIT IN CONTEXT 
In order to understand the policy problem the ownership split was intended to 
remedy, it is necessary to understand some background to the 1998 reforms. 
Generally, it should be noted that an electricity industry has four distinct 
components: generation; long distance transmission via the high-voltage 
national grid; distribution via local lines networks; and retail to consumers. 
A 1888 - 1987: From Fledgling Industry to Effective Monopoly 
As with most new industries, electricity in New Zealand was initially the 
province of pioneering entrepreneurs. New Zealand's first public electricity 
supply began just over a century ago in Reefton on 4 August 1888.
12 Following 
this, a number of private individuals or companies set up generators - either for 
their own use or for public supply. 13 The government, recognising the value of 
this new resource, moved fast. By 1896, local authorities were prohibited from 
granting water concessions for the purpose of hydro electricity generation; 
14 
and by 1903 the sole right to use water for generation was vested in the Crown 
which could also compulsorily acquire existing water rights for the same 
purpose. 15 
Then followed three statutes which defined the shape of the industry for most of 
this century: the State Supply of Electricity Act 1917; the Electric-power 
11 In 1998 there were 35 electricity companies, 22 of which were wholly-community owned: 
Carolyn Wylie New Zealand Electricity Directory 1998 (Chameleon Enterprises, Wellington, 
1998), 19. 
12 This occurred when a local plumber connected residents to a generator, giving them electric 
lighting: Neil Rennie Power to the People: One Hundred Years of Electricity Supply in New 
Zealand(Electricity Supply Association ofNew Zealand, Wellington, 1989), 13. 
13 For instance, Wellington's first public lighting was supplied in 1889 by the Gulcher Electric 
Light and Power Co: Rennie, above n 12, 34-35. 
14 Electrical Motive-power Act 1896, 60 Viet 149, s 2. 
15 
Water Power Act 1903, 3 Edw VII 54, s 2. The Government's first hydro-electric project was 
Lake Coleridge, developed between 1911-14 to supply electricity to Christchurch: John E 
Martin (ed) People, Politics and Power Stations (2ed, ECNZ, Wellington, 1998), 47-48. 
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Boards Act 1918; and the Municipal Corporations Act 1920. The first of these 
gave the government the sole right to acquire, construct or maintain any 
generation scheme. 16 The second allowed New Zealand to be carved into 
separate electric power districts for which a specific body, named an electric 
power board, was authorised to supply electricity to end users. 17 An electric 
power board was a locally elected committee. Power boards were prohibited 
from purchasing or building generation schemes without government 
permission. 18 Finally the Municipal Corporations Act 1920 permitted local 
councils to supply electricity to their constituents. 19 
The system these statutes created was consolidated in the Electricity Act 1968 
and essentially remained in place until 1987. The government had a statutory 
monopoly on generation but did not supply electricity directly to consumers. 20 
This was done by either power boards or local authorities, collectively known 
as Electricity Supply Authorities ("ESAs"), which brought electricity in bulk 
from the state.21 ESA's could not compete with each other but held 'area 
franchises': licences authorising distribution and retail to a specific area. 22 
The public supply system developed apace. Between 1920 and 1960 twenty-
two generation plants were built, including Roxburgh, Arapuni and Otahuhu.23 
In 1965 the Cook Strait high-voltage cable was put into operation, giving the 
16 State Supply of Electricity Act 1917, 8 Geo V 111, s 3(1). 
17 Electric-power Boards Act 1918, 9 Geo V 35, ss 3(1) and 4(1). This Act was actually soon 
repealed and replaced by the very similar Electric-power Boards Act 1925, 16 Geo V 316 (see s 
129 and the schedule). The corresponding sections in the 1925 Act are ss 3(1) and 9(1). For 
relevance, all further references are to the 1925 Act. 
18 Electric-power Boards Act 1925, 16 Geo V 316, s 76( I). Even with permission, the 
government could, by giving 12 months notice, purchase the works for itself: Electric-power 
Boards Act 1925, 16 Geo V 316, s 95. 
19 Municipal Corporations Act 1920, 11 Geo V 283, s 281 (I). 
20 Electricity Act 1968, ss 25 and 26. In practice, it took the government some time to acquire a 
genuine generation monopoly. For much of the 1930s, the only way for a community to get 
electricity was to build its own generation plant. However as the state hydro system grew, such 
schemes became less significant or were purchased by the government: Rennie, above n 12, 
108. 
21 With such a large and fledgling industry, there were obviously exceptions. For instance the 
government took over the operations of the Southland Electric Power Board in 1936. Similarly, 
many ESA's were allowed to build, and continued to own, generation plants. This happened in 
particularly in Northland, Nelson/Marlborough, Central Otago and the West Coast: Rennie, 
aboven 12,108. 
22 Electricity Act 1968, s 20. 
23 Martin, above n 15, 331. 
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North Island access to South Island hydro power and creating a national grid.
24 
Truly large-scale generators, such as Manapouri and Clyde (hydro) and 
Otahuhu and Stratford (gas-turbine), were commissioned between 1960 and 
1980.25 By 1988 almost all New Zealanders were or could be connected to the 
. 1 "d 26 nat10na gr1 . 
Thus by the mid-1980s New Zealand's electricity infrastructure was mostly in 
place. Legally, the system was made up of two separate monopolies. The State 
owned and had built most generation plants and the national grid. However 
local ESAs developed and operated the distribution networks and supplied 
customers with electricity. The overall result - 90% of customers able to 
receive electricity - was clearly a 'partnership' between the State and local 
communities. The system could not have been developed so quickly or 
effectively any other way. 
B 1987 -1996: Restructuring an Industry 
In the 1980s the Government department responsible for electricity was the 
New Zealand Electricity Division ("NZED") of the Ministry of Energy. At this 
time, the NZED generated almost all of New Zealand's electricity. On 1 April 
1987 the NZED became ECNZ, New Zealand's largest SOE.27 A few months 
later the government removed the requirement for state approval to set up hydro 
generation schemes and allowed ESA's to generate electricity themselves and 
to buy from persons other than the state.28 The state's statutory monopoly on 
generation was gone. 
Following this, two important pieces of legislation were passed: the Electricity 
Act 1992 and the Energy Companies Act 1992. The former Act repealed the 
24 Martin, above n 15, 174. 
25 Martin, above n 15,246,331. 
26 Rennie, above n 12, 245. Reticulation (the building of power lines) was usually carried out 
by ESAs. In rural areas the costs were funded by a levy on all ESAs: Rennie, above n 12, 93, 
146. 
27 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 2 and First Schedule. 
28 
Electricity Amendment Act 1987. This Act, through ss 3(k) and (I), repealed ss 25 and 26 of 
the Electricity Act 1968 (see above n 20). 
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Electricity Act 1968 and thus removed the need for area specific licences in 
d 1 1 · · 29 or er to supp y e ectnc1ty. There was no longer an obligation to sell 
electricity to particular customers, although lines had to be maintained until 
2013.30 By 1994, full retail competition was permitted. In accordance with the 
principles of light-handed regulation, the Act also provided for the making of 
information disclosure regulations.31 
The Energy Companies Act 1992 ESAs to incorporate. Every ESA had to 
submit for government approval an "establishment plan" detailing the method 
by which they would transfer their electricity (or gas) undertaking to a newly 
set up energy company ("EC"). This plan would include all relevant details, 
such as draft articles of association, the time at which the transfer would take 
place, what would happen to existing employees and, most importantly, a share 
allocation plan. 32 
The share allocation plan was not easy to formulate . It was unclear exactly who 
owned ESAs and their assets - assets that had been locally built up over most of 
this century. The Government had intended the share issue to lead to 
widespread privatisation.33 However in the end, the most popular option was an 
hybrid company/trust model. Under this model the shares in the new energy 
company would be held by a trust whose beneficiaries were the "community" -
usually electricity consumers at the time. Ultimately 21 of 44 energy 
companies elected to be wholly owned by community or consumer trusts and 
10 elected partial trust-ownership. One was a co-operative company (owned by 
29 It did this in two stages. Small consumers (persons who used less than 0.5 GWh of 
electricity) became fully contestable from I April 1993 ; larger consumers became contestable 
one year later. 
30 Electricity Act 1992, s 62, subs (2) and (6) . 
31 See the definition of " light-handed regulation" in Commerce "Background Material and 
Options for Increasing Efficiency in Electricity Distribution and Retailing", 4 December 1997, 
8 ["Commerce Four"]. 
32 Energy Companies Act 1992, s 18. The Minister of Energy could direct the content of the 
f:lan : s I 8(2)(i). 
3 See Office of the Minister of Energy "Electricity Industry Reform", I O December 1990, paras 
34 - 37. 
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the community), mne were owned by local councils; and only three were 
. d 34 mvestor-owne . 
Reform continued. In 1988 the government had reorganised ECNZ so that the 
national grid was run by a subsidiary company, named Transpower. On 1 July 
1994 the government made Transpower a separate SOE.
35 From this date, 
ECNZ was solely a generator. The decision thus separated the part of ECNZ 
that was able to compete from the natural monopoly part which was not, 
providing equal access to the national grid. 
In February 1996, a new SOE, Contact Energy, was split from ECNZ.
36 It was 
to be a significant generator owning 8 power stations. Overall, it represented 
22% of New Zealand electricity production. 37 Until 1998, both ECNZ and 
Contact were forbidden to enter into the retail market through directives in their 
Statements of Corporate Intent.38 Incidentally, Contact was privatised in April 
1999 following the collapse of the coalition government, whose core agreement 
had prohibited the sale of certain strategic assets, including Contact, ECNZ and 
Transpower. 39 
Finally, in October 1996, a wholesale market for electricity was established by 
the industry. A wholesale electricity market is basically a multi-lateral contract 
whereby market participants (generators, purchasers and traders) agree to a 
methodology for determining the price and dispatch of electricity. The market 
had been in the pipeline since 1992 and there had been many different 
suggestions. The market ultimately established was not compulsory and was 
34 Carolyn Wylie New Zealand Electricity Directory 1993 (Chameleon Enterprises, Wellington, 
1993), 13 . 
35 State-Owned Enterprises Order 1994 (SR 1994/87). 
36 State-Owned Enterprises Order 1995 (SR 1995/250). 
37 Martin, above n 15, 323. It now represents 28%: "Investment Statement" above n 3 15 . 
38 ' ' For Contact see Statements of Corporate Intent for 1996 to 1998. Compare 1999: "Contact's 
core business is primarily the production and sale of energy" (emphasis added"). For ECNZ 
see Statements of Corporate Intent for 1995 to 1998. Compare 1999: "The Corporation's 
business is primarily the generation and marketing of electricity". ECNZ was also placed under 
special restrictions relating to pricing structures and building new generators: see Memorandum 
of Understanding between ECNZ and the Crown, 8 June 1995, in the New Zealand Gazette, 23 
February 1996, No 16,525. 
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owned by an entity independent of both the government and industry 
participants. It is an "ex-post" market in that prices are not known in advance 
but are based on the offers of generators feeding load into the pool. The highest 
cost electricity necessary to meet demand is determined every half hour, setting 
the 'spot' price for that half hour, and the lowest-bid electricity is then sold 
first. 40 The market is self-regulating, having established a Market Surveillance 
Committee for this purpose. 
C 1996 -1998: Structure in Place but Results Slow in Coming 
By 1996, New Zealand had one of the most deregulated electricity industries in 
the world. The transmission grid was owned by a separate entity. Competitive 
generation was not only permitted but actively encouraged by the government. 
To this very end, Contact had been created and a wholesale market was in 
operation. And since 1994 full retail competition was permitted. In short, 
anyone could produce electricity, gain access to the national grid and sell to any 
consumer. 
However the obstinate status quo remained. In practice, competition m 
generation was tame, competition for industrial consumers was moderate, and 
competition for most commercial and all domestic consumers was non-
existent. 41 As regards generation, ECNZ had market dominance and was able 
to manipulate both wholesale and hedge markets. 42 On the retail side, 
competition was small and getting smaller. By 1997, it appeared that the 
39 The sale was comprised of a 60% public share float and a 40% "cornerstone" stake, sold to 
Edison Mission Energy Taupo Ltd, a subsidiary of the US based Edison Mission Energy. See 
State Owned Enterprises (Contact Energy) Amendment Act 1998. 
40 It is called a spot price because every imbalance between the electricity contracted for and the 
electricity in fact used is treated as an instantaneous spot transaction. 
41 The Commerce Commission estimated that competition was effectively limited to customers 
who consumed more than 0.5GWh per annum. Sixty-one per cent of total consumers used less 
than this and thus were effectively not contestable. See "Commerce Four", above n 31, 17. 
42 A hedge contract is a contract whereby the buyer agrees to buy electricity at a fixed price, 
regardless of the spot price on the day. It is primarily a financial instrument and is used to 
"hedge" against the risks of variable spot prices. 
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proportion of the "contestable" industrial customers being supplied by 
competing retailers was between 3.3% and 8.5% and was shrinking.
43 
Domestic power prices rose 21 % in real terms between 1987 and 1997. 
44 
Industrial prices fell 7% and commercial prices fell 26% in real terms during 
this period.45 There were three good reasons for this disparity. The first was 
the removal of the historic cross-subsidy from commercial to domestic 
consumers; the second was the transition of ESAs from non-profit power 
boards to companies required to earn a commercial rate of retum;
46 
and the 
third was the existence of competition for industrial customers. However, these 
caveats aside, the new system clearly was not working properly. While New 
Zealand had a more competitively oriented market than most in the world, 
consumers - especially domestic consumers - were still awaiting results. 
1 Problems identified 
In the leadup to the Act, a number of problems in were identified, some actual; 
some theoretical. Before discussing the decision to split integrated ECs, it is 
helpful to first highlight some of the major problems which the ownership split 
was not intended to solve. 
First, the main problem in the generation sector was a lack of players. The 
market was a duopoly and ECNZ had clear market dominance.47 It was able to 
set the spot price in the market and sold electricity mostly through its own 
43 The fonner figure (3.3% - down from 4.6% in 1996) is the proportion of electricity reconciled 
through the wholesale market. However as the market is not compulsory, electricity could still 
be sold competitively outside it. The Commerce Commission estimated the figure of 8.5% 
(down from 9.9% in 1996) overall: see "Commerce Four", above n 31, 16. 
44 Official's Committee on Energy Policy ("OCEP") "Electricity Distribution and Retail Sector 
Reform" (Briefing Paper), 24 October 1997, 2 ["OCEP Five"]. "Commercial" consists of 
trade, transport, communications and services. "Industrial" consists of primary industries, 
including manufacturing, electricity, gas water and construction. 
45 ' "OCEP Five", above n 44, 2. 
46 
Both factors are explicitly acknowledged in "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3 3· 
"Commerce Four", above n 31, 5 and 7; and Treasury "Regulatory Issues in the Electri~it; 
Distribution and Retail Sector" 28 August 1997, 4 ["Treasury One"]. 
47 This is acknowledged in "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 6. 
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hedge contracts which it often priced above the wholesale market anyway.48 
Purchasers had no real alternative but to buy from ECNZ at ECNZ-set prices - a 
problem that was not adequately addressed by Contact's market presence since 
1996.49 ECNZ's incentives were to keep average wholesale prices up around 
the entry price to the market rather than strive to drive them down. As an 
example, in 1996 and 1997 the cost-effective Huntly power station sacrificed 
volume to the older, less efficient New Plymouth power station in order to 
maintain overall ECNZ prices. so In a truly competitive environment, Huntly 
would bid below New Plymouth to maintain its market share. As generation 
costs comprise roughly 45% of an average power bill, higher than necessary 
generation charges were a genuine concern. 51 This problem was addressed by 
dividing ECNZ into three smaller competitive chunks. 
Secondly, in the retail and distribution sectors, the most obvious problems were 
the technological impediments to domestic competition. In order for 
competition, there had to be some system for reconciling whose electricity was 
travelling through which lines at which time. Essentially this required what are 
known as "time-of-use" meters which measure levels of electricity consumption 
every half-hour (the same period as changes in the spot price), as opposed to 
more familiar meters which only measure consumption cumulatively. 52 Large 
industrial customers have had time-of-use meters installed for years. 
However such meters are expensive, costing around $300-$400 to install. 53 
Retail is notoriously the last profitable of the four electricity businesses (being 
generation, transmission, lines and retail). The net retail margin from an 
average domestic electricity customer is basically between 3 and 6 percent of 
48 See ECNZ "Response to Electricity Industry Review", 11 December 1997, 9 ["Response to 
Review"]. Eighty-seven percent of electricity in 1997 was traded through hedge contracts. 
ECNZ was dominant in both markets. 
49 Market opinion largely viewed Contact as merely "following" ECNZ-set prices: see OCEP 
"Electricity Reforms: Summary of Submissions", 29 August 1997, Annex II ["OCEP Two"]. 50 ECNZ "Response to Review", above n 48, 7 (officials' comment on ECNZ's submissions). 51 Gary Eng, Energy Analyst, Ministry of Commerce, 26 August 1999 (giving an informal 
estimate). The Community-Owned Companies Submission to the Commerce Committee (June 
1998), para 4.1 ["Community Companies Submission"] estimated 50%. 52 Electricity Market Company "Competition In the Retail Market: A Backgrounder", 
(Electricity Market Company, Wellington, February 1999), 1-2. 
12 
the total bill.54 Or $50 per customer per annum. 55 Installing time-of-use meters 
across the board simply wasn't economic for ECs which would not easily 
recoup the expense with retail profit. 56 Similarly, consumers would not easily 
recoup the cost of such meters by potential savings they could make from 
competition.57 This was the biggest barrier to retail competition identified by 
most government ad visors. 58 This problem was addressed by exhorting the 
industry to develop deemed profiling, which uses agreed statistical profiles to 
estimate the load share of individual customers. Profiling has been in use since 
1 April 1999. 
Residual problems of weak domestic retail competition were also addressed by 
allowing Contact and the three new SOE generators to enter the retail market 
for the first time. 
Thirdly, there was a smaller but still significant problem related to the valuation 
methodology for lines businesses. Although not capped by explicit legislation, 
lines businesses (like all monopoly businesses) were commonly understood to 
be under implicit rate of return regulation, in that their lines business profits 
should not exceed their weighted average cost of capital ("W ACC"). 59 W ACC 
53 NZIER "Metering and Profiling: Competition for Small Electricity Consumers", September 
1997, 3 ["Metering and Profiling"] . 
54 There is broad industry agreement that the average gross margin (from which all indirect and 
administrative costs must come) is about 10% of the total bill : see "Cabinet Committee Two", 
above n 3, 1 O; "Metering and Profiling", above n 53, 2. The Community Companies 
Submission, above n 51, para 4.1 estimated the average net retail margin left over to be 3%. It 
is widely acknowledged not to be higher than 6%: interview with Alan Jenkins, CEO Electricity 
Networks Association, 3 August 1999. 
55 Assessed at a net margin of 5%. Figures based on the average New Zealand domestic 
consumer using 8000 kWh (the consumption deemed to be average by the Energy Market 
Regulation Unit of the Ministry of Commerce) of energy a year at the 1998 overall average 
rice of 12.54 cents per kWh (for the data source, see Appendix One). 
6 "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 6. 
57 "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 6. 
58 S "C b. C . T " b " ee a met omm1ttee wo , a oven-' , 6; Commerce "Magnitude of Regulatory Problems 
in Electricity Distribution and Retailing", 21 November 1997, 4 ["Commerce Three"]; OCEP 
"Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform: Policy Options", 18 February 1998, 3 ["OCEP 
Eight"] ; Treasury "Competition Issues in the Electricity Industry", Memorandum to Senior 
Management Group, 9 October 1997, 12 ["Treasury Two"] ; Commerce "NZIER Report: 
Metering and Profiling: Competition for Small Electricity Consumers" 3 October 1997 3 
["Commerce Two"] ; and "Metering and Profiling", above n 53 , 2. See al~o OCEP "Electri~ity 
~eforms: Summary of Submissions", 29 August 1997, 4-5 ["OCEP Two"] . 
See "Commerce Four", above n 31 , 10. 
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is basically the cost to a company of financing its capital expenses.60 An 
accounting rate of profit ("ARP") equal to W ACC shows that a monopoly 
business is exactly covering its costs and not extracting monopoly profits .61 
However in order to determine the ARP of a business, the value of the 
companies' asset base has to be decided first. Crudely, the larger the asset base, 
the greater the permissible profits. There was a perceived problem in the rules 
for valuing monopoly assets. The methodology used, called Optimal Deprival 
Valuation ("ODV"), was generally viewed as being too flexible . Some 
companies had made significant upward ODV valuations in recent years and the 
market value of some companies also appeared to be in excess of ODV.62 This 
problem was addressed by the new VDV handbook published in May 1999 by 
the Ministry of Commerce. 63 
Fourthly, there were too many ECs operating in small areas. This number 
steadily dropped following the 1987 reforms but was still too high. Greater 
efficiencies would be achieved through mergers or amalgamations. This 
problem was not directly addressed. It could be argued that it was indirectly 
targeted by some of the other measures such as the threatened price control and 
(in the retail industry) the ownership split. However it is fair to say that 
industry rationalisation was a hoped for side effect, rather than a primary aim, 
of the reform measures as a whole. In fact, since the 1998 reforms, the total 
number of electricity companies has increased. 
D 1998: Specific Policy Problems Requiring Ownership Split 
The ownership split was introduced to cure the mam problem in the 
distribution/retail side of the industry: a lack of domestic competition. 
However, in truth, competition was prevented by inadequate technology. Until 
deemed profiling was developed in 1999, there was no cost-effective data 
60 McKinlay Douglas Ltd "Retail Competition" September 1997, I O ["McKinlay Douglas"]. 61 "Commerce Four", above n 3 I, I O. 
62 For instance, Mercury Energy increased its ODV by 19% in 1995/96 and Southpower 
increased its ODV by 27% in 1996/97: "Commerce Four", above n 31 , 11 . 63 See above n 8. 
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reconciliation method allowing domestic customers to be supplied by different 
retailers. So there was no ability to compete for such customers. 
However the Government was also concerned about certain largely theoretical 
problems inherent in integrated lines/supply businesses. The basic concern is 
easy to state: ECs were composed of two (and sometimes three) related 
businesses: a lines business, which is a natural monopoly in that it would 
ordinarily be inefficient for a competitor to duplicate the local network; and a 
retail and sometimes a generation business, which are potentially competitive. 
The government was concerned about the problems created by leaving both the 
natural monopoly and the potentially competitive businesses in a single entity. 
These problems are conveniently listed in a host of government discussion 
papers on this issue. Integrated lines/supply ECs are said to have incentives 
to:64 
1. charge monopoly rents for use of their lines; 
2. cross-subsidise costs of their retail or generation businesses with profits 
from their lines businesses, thus providing anti-competitively low-cost 
services or funding inefficient generation; and 
3. restrict competitor access to their lines. 
The main concerns were therefore threefold: the potential for monopoly rents, 
cross-subsidisation and restricted access. 65 
The point of this section is to isolate problems the ownership split could 
conceivably fix from those which were targeted by other means. Generation 
problems, the lack of adequate technology and ineffective valuation 
64 
See Treasury "Separation of Line and Energy Businesses", 9 June 1988, 1-2 ["Treasury 15"]; 
Treasury "Update on Reforms in the Electricity Distribution and Retailing Sectors", 2 March 
1998 _["_Treasury S~;en"]; "Treasury Two", above n 58, 12; Treasury "Competition in the 
Electnc1ty Industry Memorandum to Senior Management Group, 17 February I 998 I 
["Treasury Five"]; OCEP "Electricity Distribution Reforms: OCEP Briefing to Ministers;' 3 
September 1997, I ["OCEP Three"]; "OCEP Eight", above n 58, I; and "Commerce Three", 
above n 58, I. 
65 See documents listed in n 64 above. 
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methodology had been otherwise addressed. The reason for the ownership split 
was simply to fix the three concerns above. 
Ill GOVERNMENT REASONING 
The Government was not short on advice as to how to deal with these three 
issues. Reporting to it were two government departments, Treasury and the 
Ministry of Commerce ("Commerce"); an interdepartmental body, the Officials 
Committee on Energy Policy ("OCEP");66 and a number of private consultants. 
A huge volume of options, arguments, pros and cons were produced over about 
eight months. There are two very interesting features about this wealth of 
advice. The first is that it was all largely in agreement. The second is that the 
Government chose to ignore it. 
A Evidence and Analysis of Specific Policy Problems 
All of the various advisors acknowledged the potential problems of monopoly 
rents, cross-subsidisation and restrictive access. They concluded however that 
these problems were largely theoretical - there were economic incentives for 
such behaviour, but little evidence that it was occurring. It was common 
ground that there had been no study of these issues and that any evidence of the 
three anti-competitive practices was inconclusive at best. 
This last point is significant. Not only was there no specially commissioned 
study; but information which was available had never been analysed. A paper 
prepared for a Cabinet Committee noted that, although information was 
disclosed annually under the relevant regulations "the disclosed information is 
not adequately scrutinised from the regulatory perspective (the Ministry of 
Commerce is not currently resourced to do this work and the scrutiny from non-
Government agencies appears to be limited)". 67 Indeed, one of Treasury's 
66 Comprising representatives from Treasury, the Prime Minister's Department, and the 
Ministries of Commerce and the Environment. 
67 "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 11. The Ministry of Commerce stated that its analysis 
of disclosed information "has been confined to the ranking of companies on the basis of their 
disclosed performance measures": "Commerce Four", above n 31, 9. 
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recommendations was that the reforms include funding to actually analyse 
disclosed information. 68 
Turning to the first of the three concerns, monopoly pricing was seen as the 
most serious problem. Even so, evidence of its practice was scarce. Treasury 
stated that " [i]t is unclear that monopoly pricing is more of a problem in the 
case of electricity than in other [ vertically integrated natural monopoly] 
industries".69 The term "monopoly pricing" can in fact denote two different 
problems: excessive profits and excessive costs. Officials did not identify any 
tangible evidence of excessive profits - OCEP openly stated that its main 
concern was the "future potential" for problems. 7° Commerce compared the 
accounting rate of profit ("ARP") of ECs for the years 1994/95 to 1996/97 to an 
estimated WACC range and found that that ARPs were roughly halfWACC.
71 
As noted above, an ARP equal to W ACC indicates a firm is exactly covering its 
d · , fi 72 costs an not eammg excessive pro its. An ARP of half W ACC is 
exceptional. Commerce thus concluded that ECs are "on average not earning 
monopoly profits on their line businesses at present". 73 
Commerce argued that there was a good possibility that, even if monopoly 
profits were not being made, monopoly costs were being charged. Commerce 
viewed this problem as the most significant and argued that lines businesses had 
potential for $40-$1 OOm per annum savings in efficiency gains. 74 Other 
advisors were not so convinced. Treasury consistently highlighted the lack of 
evidence of any monopoly pricing in the first place. 75 The OCEP concluded 
68 Treasury "Competition in the Electricity Retail and Distribution Sectors - Update", 21 
October 1997, 2 ["Treasury Three"]. 
69 "Treasury One", above n 46, 4. 
70 "OCEP Three", above n 64, 3. 
71 "Commerce Four", above n 31 , 10. 
72 "Commerce Four", above n 31 , 10. 
73 
"Commerce Three", above n 31 , 2. For 1994/95 the ARP median was 3.85, the WACC range 
7.4-8.9; for 1995/96 the ARP median was 4.79, the WACC range 8.4-9 .9; for 1996/97 the ARP 
median was 5.46, the WACC range 8.5-10 .0. See also "Commerce Four" above n 31 JI · 
"OCEP Five", above n 44, 5. ' ' ' 
74 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 1-2. 
75 See "Treasury One", above n 46, 4; "Treasury Three", above n 68, 13 . 
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more modestly that without robust competition, "pressure on costs may be 
insufficient to achieve the Government's objectives". 76 
The evidence of cross-subsidisation was extremely weak. Commerce 
acknowledged that its examination of cost allocations between lines and retail 
activities indicated that: 77 
... the majority of companies seem to be allocating a greater than 
expected proportion of their costs to their retail activities. This is the 
opposite to what would be expected if companies were attempting to 
cross-subsidise their retail or generation activities from their natural 
monopoly distribution activities. 
Commerce noted that analysis of retail margins for different customer groups of 
individual companies "provides only very isolated evidence of cross-
subsidies". 78 OCEP stated that is "not possible to conclude whether cross-
subsidisation is occurring". 79 Treasury and Commerce both argued that cross-
subsidies were not even consistent with profit-maximising behaviour in the 
long-term.80 This is because a cross-subsidy involves the injection of profits 
from one business to make another more competitive. Long-term overall profit 
is lessened. Thus not only was there little evidence of cross-subsidisation, the 
strength of incentives to do so were questionable. 
The access problem was widely acknowledged to be mmor and largely 
historical. 81 Although Commerce opined that ECs have strong incentives to 
restrict access in order to retain captive customers, 82 officials admitted that 
"there is no explicit evidence of access problems". 83 A recent report had noted 
that "large electricity companies had moved away from restrictive access 
76 "OCEP Five", above n 44, 4 (emphasis added). 
77 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3 (emphasis added). 
78 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3. 
79 "Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 11. 
80 "Treasury One", above n 46, 5; "Commerce Four", above n 31, 21. 
81 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3. 
82 "Commerce Four", above n 31, 19. 
83 "Treasury Two", above n 58, 13. See also "Commerce Four", above n 31, 19. 
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arrangements to more open access and that access pricing 1s ' less ' than the 
Baumol-Willig rule". 84 
Most sources recognised restrictive access as being addressed by the Commerce 
Act 1986 or more promisingly by industry development of standard use of 
system agreements . 85 Treasury also believed that the introduction of deemed 
profiling and robust generation competition would work to reduce access 
problems. 86 Reports noted that in the last six months of 1997 the Commerce 
Commission received only two complaints about access to lines. 
87 Officials 
agreed that electricity access problems were less significant than those seen in 
telecommunications. 88 
Finally, most advisers also believed high community ownership of ECs to be a 
concern. In 1997, there were 22 wholly community-owned companies (20 
trusts and two co-operatives) and only 5 investor-controlled companies out of 
35.89 There were three alleged problems. The first was lack of efficiency. 
Community-owned companies were perceived to lack the financial discipline 
and accountability demanded by private shareholders.90 Officials noted that 
forced separation of ECs would discourage smaller provincial trusts to exit 
competitive generation and retail markets and choose the safer lines business.91 
This was seen as appropriate, although Treasury at one stage suggested that 
84 "Treasury One", above n 46, 4. This rule had been controversially applied by the Privy 
Council to the telecommunications industry. 
85 This was thought to be sufficient by OCEP: see Cabinet Committee on Industry and the 
Environment "Electricity Reforms : Paper 4: Options for Electricity Distribution and Retailing", 
28 November 1997, CIE (97) 195, 8 ["Cabinet Committee Four"]. See also "McKinlay 
Douglas", above n 60, 3; Cabinet Committee on Industry and the Environment "Electricity 
Reforms: Paper 1: Overview", 1 December 1997; CIE (97) 192, 9 ["Cabinet Committee One"]; 
"Cabinet Committee Two", above n 3, 9; and "Treasury One", above n 46, 4. 
86 Treasury, "Draft Parliamentary Question for Oral Answer", 16 June 1998, 2 ["Treasury 16"]; 
Treasury "Electricity Reform Package" 24 March 1998, 2 ["Treasury Nine"]. 
87 "Treasury Two", above n 58, 13 . 
88 "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85 , 8. 
:: See Carolyn Wylie Electricity in N~w Zealand (Cham~leon Enterprises, Wellington, 1997). 
Commerce believed that community-owned companies were more likely to pass monopoly 
costs through to consumers due to inefficiency: see "Commerce Four", above n 31 , 15. 
Commerce and Treasury believed that trusts would take "a less rigorous approach to the 
economics of investment": "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 6. 
9 1 
OCEP stated that one of the advantages of separation was that it may "encourage trusts to exit 
retailing and generation": "OCEP Three", above n 64, 7. A consultant stated that its concerns 
about ownership separation did not apply to trusts "which can still for this purpose be seen as 
part of the wider public sector": "McKinley Douglas", above n 60, 4. 
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trusts should be forced out of the industry entirely as private lines businesses 
would also be more efficient. 92 
The second problem was a view that community companies were reluctant to 
merge and thus rationalise the market. The third problem was that trusts were 
viewed as anti-competitive. · Official papers including Cabinet Minutes 
repeatedly noted that trust-ownership of retail businesses may "reduce the level 
of retail competition where rebates or low prices based on non-commercial rates 
of return are offered to customers of the trust". 93 Accordingly, ECNZ's main 
presentation to the Government argued that ownership separation would "solve 
the Trust problem";94 and Treasury suggested that a potential solution to 
retail/distribution problems was to "ban trusts".95 
B Advice Tendered and Government Response 
Despite having the advantage of dissuading trusts from contestable activities, 
advisers overwhelmingly opposed ownership separation of lines and retail 
businesses. 96 The advice from different quarters was remarkably consistent. 
All advisers saw the main industry problems as belonging to the generation 
sector or caused by inadequate technology - and these had been addressed by 
other means. 97 Of the three remaining problems, monopoly rents was viewed as 
the only genuine concern.98 All advisers made the same two points about this 
problem. One: monopoly rents would not be prevented by ownership 
92 This Treasury comment is noted in "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 6. 
93 Cabinet "Electricity Reform Proposals", 15 December 1997, CAB (97) M 47/33 , 4 ["Cabinet 
One"]; "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 9. 
94 ECNZ "Response to Review", above n 48, 5. 
95 "Treasury One", above n 46, 6. 
96 Cabinet Economic Committee "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reforms", 23 March 1998, 
ECO (98) 31, 3 ["Cabinet Committee 11 "]; Hon M Bradford "Paper 1: Electricity Distribution 
and Retail Reform" 20 March 1998, 10-11 (summary of officials' views of key issues) ["Paper 
l "]; Tony Baldwin (Chair of OCEP) "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform: Key Issues", 
17 March 1998, 2 ["OCEP 1 O"]; "OCEP Eight", above n 58, l O; "Treasury Five", above n 64, 
7; "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; Commerce "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform -
Policy Options", 18 March 1998, 2 (of annex) ["Commerce Six"]; "McKinley Douglas", above 
n 60, 4. 
97 See above nn 58 and 96. 
98 "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; "Commerce Three", above n 58, 1; Treasury "Aide 
Memoire: Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform Options: Key Issues", 18 March 1998, 2 
["Treasury Eight"]; "OCEP Eight", above n 58, l; "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 4. 
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separation, as a stand-alone lines company could still charge excessive prices. 
99 
Two: on the other hand, preventing monopoly rents would also prevent cross-
subsidisation.100 This is because it was only the excess line profits which 
allowed the subsidy to be made in the first place.
101 Remove the profits and 
you remove the subsidy. 
Treasury, Commerce and the OCEP advised that the key regulatory instrument 
was a credible government threat of price control - the most direct means of 
deterring monopoly pricing. 102 This threat should be supplemented by better 
disclosure regulations; ODV rules; enhanced Commerce Act penalties and 
funded information analysis .103 These measures, together with deemed 
profiling; pressure from the ECNZ ' babies' and standard use-of-system 
agreements were viewed as sufficient to address residual access problems.
104 
All advisers conceded that ownership separation would effectively address 
cross-subsidisation and access problems (but not monopoly rents) .105 However 
they all noted that these two problems were among the least significant 
concerns in the sector. 106 All were of the view that the extra benefits of total 
separation were outweighed by the likely costs.107 
99 "Treasury Eight", above n 98, 1; OCEP "Draft Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform -
Policy Options", 18 March 1998, 11 ["OCEP 11 "]; "OCEP Three", above n 64, 2 ( of summary). 
100 "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; "Commerce Three", above n 58 , 4; "Cabinet Committee 
Four", above n 85 , 4 and 6. 
101 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 4; "Commerce Four", above n 3 1, 22; "Cabinet Committee 
One", above n 85 , 1 O; Hon M Bradford, "Paper I", above n 96, 11 (summary ofofficials ' views 
of key issues). 
102 Treasury "Electricity Reform Package: Distribution: Enhancing Threat of Price Control", 27 
March 1998, 2 ("[a]side from s 36 of the Commerce Act ... price control is the key instrument 
for addressing monopoly profits and costs") ["Treasury I O"]; Treasury "Cabinet Strategy 
Subcommittee Item on Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform", 31 March 1998, I and 2 
["Treasury 11 "]; "Commerce Six", above n 96, 2 (of annex) . 
103 "Treasury Two", above n 58, 15. 
104 Treasury stated "[w]e consider that the Commerce Act is generally adequate in addressing 
access issues, though its effectiveness could perhaps be improved through enhancement of 
penalties and remedies": "Treasury Three", above n 68, 8. See also "Treasury 11 ", above n 
102, 3; "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85 , 4-5 . 
105 
"Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; Treasury "Electricity Reform: Corporate Separation of Line 
and Energy Businesses", 3 April 1998, 2 ["Treasury 12"]; Hon M Bradford, "Paper l ", above n 
96, 11 (summary of officials ' views of key issues)· "McKinlay Douglas" above n 60 4. 
106 ' ' ' See for instance "Treasury Eight", above n 98, 1. 
107 
"McKinlay Douglas", above n 60, 4; "Cabinet Committee 11", above n 102, 3; Hon M 
Bradford, "Paper I" above n 96, 10-11 (summary of officials ' views of key issues) ; "Treasury 
Five", above n 64, 7; "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; "Treasury One", above n 46, 2; Treasury 
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On 15 December 1997, the Government adopted the recommendations for 
tighter disclosure regulations; new ODV rules; government-funded information 
analysis and threatened intervention on profiling if the industry did not develop 
a system first. 108 Cabinet left the options of separation and price control on the 
table over the new year. 109 
As history now shows, the Government did not take the advice against 
separation. The Hon M Bradford, Minister for Energy, remained unswayed by 
conclusions that an ownership split was unnecessary; did not tackle the problem 
of monopoly rents; and that its costs outweighed likely benefits. On 23 March 
1998, the Hon M Bradford recommended an ownership split to the Cabinet 
Economic Committee.110 This recommendation was accepted by the 
Committee on 25 March 1988 and by Cabinet on 6 April 1998. 111 
Mr Bradford 's reasoning is set out in certain papers leading up to 6 April. His 
thesis was that the recommended measures merely tinkered with the existing 
"monopolistic" system and did not show sufficient future vision. 11 2 Mr 
Bradford argued that the key policy problem stemmed from integrated (natural 
monopoly) lines and (potentially competitive) generation and retail 
businesses. 11 3 Mr Bradford viewed the two types of activities as theoretically 
and practically distinct. Any regulatory difficulties which stemmed from their 
intersection were best solved by their total separation. Objections that this step 
"Ministers ' Meeting on Electricity Reforms", 25 November 1997, 2 ["Treasury Four"]; "OPEC 
Eight", above n 58, I, 10 and 11 ; "Commerce Six", above n 96, 2 (of annex) . 108 See "Cabinet One", above n 93 , 3; "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, I ; Cabinet 
Economic Committee "Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations: Proposed 
Amendments", 18 February 1998, ECO (98) M 1/3 ["Cabinet Committee Nine"]; Cabinet 
"Report of the Cabinet Economic Committee: Week Ended 20 February 1998", 23 February 
1998, CAB (98) M 6/7B ["Cabinet Two"]); and Cabinet Economic Committee "Electricity 
(Information Disclosure) Regulations: Proposed Amendments", 13 February 1998, ECO (98) 1 
["Cabinet Committee Eight"]. See generally "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85 , 1. 109 See "Cabinet One", above n 93 , 3-4 . 
11 0 "Cabinet Committee 11 ", above n 96, 2 .. 
111 "Cabinet Committee 11 ", above n 96, 1; and Cabinet "Electricity Distribution and Retail 
Reform", 6 April 1998, CAB (98) M 12/5, 2 ["Cabinet Six"]. A proposal to allow the 
Commerce Commission to impose price controls within government-set parameters was 
adopted at the same time. 
11 2 Hon M Bradford "Future Directions in Electricity Markets", Letter to Hon W Peters, Rt Hon 
WF Birch, Hon Jenny Shipley, 23 October 1997, 1 ["Future Directions"]. 
11 3 Hon M Bradford, "Paper l ", above n 96, 2. 
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was excessive compared to the size of the problem were a result of analysis 
"heading in the wrong direction" and would "lead to a disaster".
114 Mr 
Bradford supported his argument by analogy to the 1994 split of the national 
grid Transpower from generator ECNZ. 115 
IV RESULT 
The EIR Act was enacted on 8 July 1998. 116 The Act is complex and was 
carefully drafted to minimise loopholes. The Act defined two types of 
electricity businesses: lines businesses, which convey electricity by line; 117 and 
supply businesses, which generate and/or sell electricity. 118 The main provision 
of the Act is section 17 which prohibits the same person being involved in both 
businesses. "Involved" is extremely widely defined and includes a 10% overlap 
in control or owr1ership. 119 Section 18 prohibits any parties involved in one 
type of businesses holding, in aggregate, more than 20% of the control or 
owr1ership rights in the other type of business. Section 30 prohibits a person 
increasing their existing cross-involvements (that is, increasing their breach of 
sections 17 and 18). 
The Act set out complex rules for complying with sections 17 and 18. 
Essentially there were four options: 
I Early ownership split 
A person could chose to comply by 1 July 1999. The great advantage of doing 
so was a limited exemption from section 30 until this date. 120 This gave the 
company one year to acquire new businesses before splitting up. Crucially, 
community-owr1ed supply businesses were permanently barred from 
114 
Hon M Bradford "Future Directions", above n 112 1. 
115 ' Hon M Bradford, "Paper l ", above n 96 1 and 4. 
11 6 ' 
The Act was passed under urgency and as a confidence motion. 
11 7 EIR Act, s 4. See above n 4. 
11 8 EIR Act, s 5. See above n 4. 
119 
EIR Act, s 7. See also ss 8 - 10. " Involved" also includes having "material influence" over 
a business: s 7. For the definition of "material influence", sees 11. 
120 EIR Act, s 35. 
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expanding. 121 Unlike other companies, they could not acquire new generation 
or retail assets. 
2 Delayed ownership split 
A person could chose to comply with by 1 January 2004. 122 The quid pro quo 
was no exemption from section 30 (that is, no right to expand) and an 
obligation of "corporate separation": placing both the lines and supply 
businesses in different companies which would be subject to strict "arms 
length" separation rules from 1 April 1999. 123 
3 Mirror trust 
This only applied to trust-owned ECs. 124 These trusts could, by 1 April 1999, 
form a "mirror trust" to hold the other business of the existing trust. 125 Both 
trusts must have similar trust deeds and the same beneficiaries. 126 
4 Widely held trust/company 
This also applied only to trusts. It allowed the trusts to keep one business, sell 
the other business to a company, but keep the shareholders of the company the 
same as the beneficiaries of the trust. 127 
In short, the Act required ownership separation by 2004. If this was done by 
July 1999, expansion was allowed in the meantime. If not, stringent corporate 
separation rules would apply from April 1999. Trusts were strongly 
encouraged to sell their supply businesses through a permanent bar on 
expans10n. 
121 EIR Act, s 46. This prohibits the transfer of supply businesses to "agencies" which are in 
turn defined (by s 13) as entities in which interests are held by more than 6 people, and where 
those interests were "expectancies" and not freely transferable - that is, trusts. 
122 EIR Act, s 27(a). 
123 EIR Act, ss 24 and 25. See also the First Schedule to the Act. 
124 See EIR Act, s 38 subs (3) and (4). 
125 EIR Act, ss 37 and 38. 
126 EIR Act, ss 40 and 41. 
127 EIR Act, ss 34, 20(2). 
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The reaction of the electricity industry to such legislation must have surpassed 
the Government' s wildest dreams. With one unique exception, every single EC 
in New Zealand chose early ownership separation.128 There were several 
reasons for this . Firstly, the SOE generators (Contact and the ECNZ 'babies') 
and the major foreign-owned EC's saw an opportunity to expand and become 
large generator/retailers ("genrets"). The SOE generators were being unleashed 
on the retail market for the first time, so buying customers was essential. 
129 
These large businesses thus aggressively pursued the retail and generation 
businesses of smaller ECs. Conversely, smaller ECs were concerned that they 
would be unable to compete with the new breed of genrets, especially as they 
would now have to buy most of their electricity from their competitors. 
Thirdly, the economies of scale of a stand-alone supply business effectively 
restricted this option to large players. This fact was well recognised at the 
time. 130 This problem was compounded by long-term hedge contracts which 
most ECs had purchased from ECNZ in 1995, on the Government's 
recommendation, to shore against possible instability of the new wholesale 
market. 131 By 1998 these were generally more expensive than the wholesale 
prices. Without the financial stability provided by a lines business, many ECs 
were unwilling to carry this risk.132 Fourthly, 22 of the 35 ECs were wholly 
128 The exception was Top Energy which had started building a new generation plant, Ngawha 
Power Station, just before the reforms were introduced. Being a small trust, Top Energy could 
not afford to be a stand-alone supply business, but did not want to sell Ngawha immediately. 
Top Energy thus sold its retail business to Contact Energy and applied for an exemption from 
the EIR Act for Ngawha. When its application was refused on 10 June 1999, Top Energy 
reluctantly formed a mirror trust to separately hold its lines and generation businesses. See 
Commerce Commission Decision No. 353 (I O June 1999). 
129 The SOE generators were previously prevented from retailing by directives in their 
Statements of Corporate Intent: see above, n 3 8. 
130 
During debates on the EIR Act, P Hodgson, MP (Labour) stated "What is the hidden 
agenda? The hidden agenda is that the little energy companies that split off will not stand 
alone. Despite all this mirror trust stuff, they cannot stand alone .. . That means they will be sold. 
Who will buy them? The baby ECNZs will buy them ... We are nationalising community 
assets": (19 May 1998) 568 NZPD 9155 . J Fitzsimmons, MP (Alliance) stated "At the retail 
level the Bill is designed to destroy community-owned energy trusts ... The Minister knows that 
at least the energy retailing half of a split trust will not be viable": ( 19 May 1998) 568 NZPD 
9161. 
13 1 
See Electricity Supply Association of New Zealand "Electricity Industry Reform Bill: 
Submission to Commerce Select Committee" (June 1998), 8. 
132 
It is widely understood most ECs had to deduct the (by then negative) value of these hedges 
from the supply business purchase price (see Commerce Commission Decision No. 353 (I O 
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community-owned which barred them from expanding their supply businesses. 
Mirror trusts and company/trusts were not considered fiscally viable. 133 
Finally, as everyone else was selling by April 1999, 134 many believed that to 
hang on to assets after this date would not only require corporate separation 
costs but also risk a firesale five years later. 135 
The selling frenzy between July 1998 and April 1999 was both awesome and 
confusing. The consequences of this scramble were also perhaps lost in the 
confusion. The most profound is the transfer of almost all electricity supply 
business from small ECs to a new, dominant, cabal of genrets. In 1998 there 
were 35 integrated lines/retail (and sometimes small generation) businesses and 
two large generators which did notretail. Now there are six major genrets 136 
and 31 sole lines companies. 137 The "big six" now control almost all the 
generation and retail businesses in New Zealand. 138 
With the SOE entry onto the retail market and the introduction of deemed 
profiling, retail competition was certainly possible. Whether it would work in 
practice to reduce domestic power bills is another story. In April 1999, 
TransAlta and First Electric both announced price rises. 139 TransAlta blamed 
high line charges and pointed specifically to a recent pricing change by Orion, 
June 1999), para 44). The new SOEs, as formerly ECNZ, were able to take advantage of the 
discount and then simply write off their own contracts. 
133 The Court of Appeal in Cuddan v Radley (31 March 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 
67 /99 noted at 4 that, on the evidence, the mirror trust option would "bring significant 
commercial disadvantages". 
134 The date by which all options save early ownership separation had to be selected. 
135 See Affidavit of Craig Stephen Rice (partner in PriceWaterHouseCoopers), 25 March 1999, 
para l 6(a): prepared for Radley v Cuddan (29 March 1999) unreported, High Court, Blenheim 
Registry, CP3/99 (See also the appeal, above n 133). 
136 These are TransAlta, Contact, Mighty River Power (including its retail subsidiary, First 
Electric), Trustpower, Genesis and Meridian, which together hold 97% of the retail market. 
The other 3% is held by the Natural Gas Corporation, King Country Energy, Todd Energy, and 
Fresh Start, making I O retailers in total. Statistics from "Investment Statement", above n 136, 
15 and Consumer Powerswitch Database at 
<http://www.consumer.org.nz/powerswitch/contact.html> (last accessed I September 1999). 137 Figure obtained from the Commerce Commission, 26 August 1999. 
138 There are some isolated exceptions. For example King Country, a trust-owned EC, chose to 
sell its lines and remain a supply business. It is now only 18% trust-owned. 
139 "Cheaper Power Plan in Tatters" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 7 April 
1999, I. 
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the Christchurch lines company. 140 Orion reverted back
141 
but TransAlta still 
refused to drop its prices. 142 A week later, Trustpower announced price rises 
also. 143 More quietly, substantial price rises were also announced in the 
provincial areas of Waitaki and King Country.
144 
There was a huge amount of public finger pointing by retail companies at lines 
companies and vice versa. It was difficult to know who to believe. It appeared 
that both lines and retail companies had some incentives to reduce prices. 
When they split, lines companies sold off their metering facilities to retail 
companies. This reduced the asset base on which they could claim a return. 145 
On the other hand, the fact of competition was meant to push retail prices down. 
Whoever was to blame, the publicity did not portray the EIR Act as an 
unqualified success. This was bad election year press. The government was 
stung into action. It hastily ditched the 'specific thresholds regime' announced 
in April 1998 and developed by the Commerce Commission over the previous 
year. This regime had been designed to create a credible, but not actual, threat 
of price control. It worked by ranking all lines companies according to a 
complex system, then placing the bottom 25% under price control. 
The new solution was the Commerce Act (Controlled Goods or Services) 
Amendment Bill, introduced on 27 May 1999. This Bill placed all lines 
140 "TransAlta Customers Face Big Power Price Rise" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 7 April 1999, 1. As to Orion's pricing change, see "Firms to Pass on Power Charges" 
The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 18 March 1999, C3. 
141 "Southpower Tum Down Orion Offer" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 April 1999, 
I (Southpower is the trading name for TransAlta's Christchurch operation). 
142 "Southpower Tum Down Orion Offer" above n 141, I. In fact United Networks, 
Wellington's lines company, had previously ruled out raising line charges for 2 years pursuant 
to an agreement with TransAlta: "Prices Won't Rise - United Networks" The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 20 March 1999, 15. 
143 "Trustpower Putting Prices Up", The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 May 1999, 2. 
These were only for customers in Otago, Marlborough and Bay of Plenty. 
144 
Average domestic consumer prices in King Country rose 32% (announced by King Country 
Energy on 25 April 1999): Commerce "Schedule of Domestic Electricity Prices" 26 May 1999, 
published at <http://www.moc.govt.nz/pubs/publications-03 .html#P880 _37795> (last accessed 
30 June 1999). In Waitaki prices rose 38% (announced by Meridian on 19 July 1999): Waitaki 
Power Ltd, 23 August 1999. Both prices calculated for average medium domestic customers 
using 8000kWh per annum. 
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comparues, including Transpower, directly under statutory pnce control. 146 
This was a rather dramatic departure from the mantra of light-handed regulation 
- and from the line of argument pursued by the Minister prior to the EIR Act, 
that the key to lower prices lay in the correct market structure ( ownership 
separation) not in heavy regulation. 147 
The Bill emerged intact from the Commerce Select Committee but then 
foundered due to Labour and New Zealand First respectively withdrawing their 
necessary support. 148 Both claimed to do so over concerns over the role of 
retail companies in the price hikes. Labour explained their lack of support as 
due to uncertainty over whether, and to what extent, line companies were to 
blame and sought an inquiry by the Commerce Commission. New Zealand 
First had wanted the Bill extended to control retail prices as well. The Bill has 
since been withdrawn. 
By September 1999, there is competition in the main urban centres but few 
cheaper domestic power prices on offer. 149 There is scant competition outside 
these centres. Neither lines nor supply companies are subject to any form of 
price control. 
V INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
The last 12 years of New Zealand electricity reform have actually been part of a 
wider trend. This is the international move from a state-owned, vertically-
integrated monopoly model, to one which is privately-owned, disaggregated 
145 There are also some economies of scale: for instance United Networks laid off 80 staff after 
taking over lines businesses in Auckland, Wellington and Tauranga: "Lines Network to Cut 80 
Jobs" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 April 1999, 15. 
146 Commerce Act (Controlled Goods or Services) Amendment Bill 1999, cl 54B(l). 147 As recently as 25 March 1999, the Hon M Bradford emphatically confirmed "[t]he 
Government has specifically decided not to place all lines companies under price control. The 
purpose of the proposed regime - and this is unchanged from the April 1998 reform package -
is to enhance the credibility of the threat of price control": "Closing Address to the MEUG 
Seminar", Major Electricity Users' Group Seminar, Wellington, 25 March 1999, 6. 148 Labour announced its withdrawal on 14 July 1999; New Zealand First on 2 August 1999. 
See generally "Clark Calls for Inquiry Into Power Price Rises" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 4 August 1999, 2; "New Zealand First Torpedoes Power Price Control Bill", The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 August 1999, 1. 
149 Price trends will be discussed in more detail in Part VI. 
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k d · 150 and mar et- nven. The similarity with which a number of seemingly 
different countries have chosen to restructure their electricity industries is 
151 remarkable. Most of the New Zealand reforms since 1987 have direct 
counterparts overseas. This section looks at international examples of the new 
industry paradigm and attempts to extract lessons New Zealand could learn. 
A Electricity Industry Models 
One factor behind the highly similar restructuring patterns is that most countries 
are starting from the same place. Broadly speaking, electricity industries can be 
divided into four types: vertical and horizontal monopoly; purchasing agency; 
wholesale competition; and retail competition. 152 
Early this century most countries adopted the monopoly model in developing a 
universal supply system. Here, a single state-owned entity handles generation, 
transmission and supply of electricity to all consumers. No competition is 
allowed in any area. The widespread use of this model was premised on the 
theory that only a large single entity could provide the required economies of 
scale. 
Up until the late 1980s this theory was largely true. Until new technology 
opened the way for smaller efficient generating units, 153 the optimal size of a 
150 
This trend is widely documented . See Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth Competition 
and Choice in Electricity (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chichester, 1996); Michael Trebilcock and 
Michal Gal "Market Power in Electricity Restructurings" Unpublished Paper, 25 November 
1998; CD Foster Privatisation, Public Ownership and Regulation of Natural Monopoly 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1992); Mark Armstrong, Simon Cowan and John Vickers Regulatory 
Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994); Matthew 
Bishop, John Kay and Colin Mayer Privatisation and Economic Performance (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994); Aynsley Hellow Transforming Power: the Politics of 
Electricity Planning (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
151 
See for example the United Kingdom; Victoria, New South Wales, Australian Capital 
Territories, South Australia and Queensland (Australia); Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba and British 
Columbia (Canada); Argentina; Chile; Columbia; Venezuela; Spain; Bulgaria; the Czech 
Republic ; India; Egypt; Norway; Denmark; Finland; Sweden; Ukraine; and California, Maine, 
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania (United States). Some of these countries are obviously more 
advanced than others. 
152 
This division is derived from Hunt and Shuttleworth, above n 150, 22. For a recent 
aEplication of this division, see Trebilcock and Gal, above n 150, 12-17. 
1 3 
Particularly combined cycle gas turbines: see Trebilcock and Gal, above n 150, 9. 
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generation plant had continued to grow to match increased demand. 154 Only a 
very large monopoly supplier could keep building these larger structures. 155 A 
monopoly model was also suited to the requirements of a developing supply 
system as it easily allowed for rural electrification, discounts to woo large 
industry, and socially subsidised pricing. Further, the concept of competition in 
electricity supply was difficult to comprehend. Competition required separating 
in some way the product (electricity) from the means of delivery (lines). It was 
not obvious how this could be done with a commodity which cannot be stored 
and must be instantly dispatched to meet demand. 
The purchasing agency model is only a slight variant on the monopoly model. 
Here, independent generators are permitted, but must sell to a single buyer (the 
'purchasing agency'). Generators do not have direct access to transmission or 
distribution lines, and customers still have no choice of supplier. This has not 
been widely used but was introduced in the United States by the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act 1978 which required integrated utilities to buy from 
independent generators at prices equivalent to their "avoided costs". 
The wholesale competition model is the first dramatic shift from an integrated 
monopoly. Here, competition for large customers (usually electricity 
distribution/retail companies or major industrial users) is permitted. Thus 
generators may sell direct to some, but not all, consumers. Commercial or 
domestic customers must still buy from their local power company. This model 
requires equal access to the grid and a trading mechanism to enable 
competition. It is thus usually supported by separation of the national grid from 
the dominant generator and a wholesale market. 
Finally, the retail competition model permits competition for all consumers, 
whether industrial, commercial or domestic. Thus local integrated lines/supply 
businesses retain a monopoly over their lines network but not over their retail 
154 See Hunt and Shuttleworth, above n 150, 2. This fact was behind the large hydro and 
nuclear power plants built after 1960. 
155 Good examples include Ontario Hydro, Electricite de France; and the United Kingdom's 
Central Electricity Generating Board. See Hellow, above n 150, 15. 
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business. Some measures must be taken to ensure that the lines part of the 
businesses does not inhibit competition. 
B Features of Transition from Monopoly to Retail Competition Model 
Over the last decade, the world has seen a general transition from the monopoly 
model to the retail competition model. The forces behind this shift include new 
technology, the fact that most countries now possess the infrastructure for 
public supply, and a new wave of regulatory thinking. Interestingly, this 
transition has almost always involved a number of key steps. 
The first is the unbundling of the transmission system (the national grid) from 
the major, usually state-owned, generator. This has usually meant placing the 
two into separate companies, although neutral prices reflecting transmission 
costs is all that is required. 156 This unbundling is generally an initial step before 
full retail competition is introduced. In England and Wales, the vertically 
integrated monopoly was initially split into four parts in 1990: two fossil-
powered generators, one nuclear generator; and the national grid. 157 Full retail 
competition was introduced nine years later in May 1999. 158 Unbundling was 
also the first step taken by Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Australian 
Capital Territories and Ontario, well before the introduction of full retail 
competition.159 In the United States transmission companies are now "common 
carriers" although retail competition is not yet on the horizon for most States.160 
156 Trebilcock and Gal, above n 150, 14. 
157 
This occurred by virtue of the Electricity Act 1989, which began the English and Welsh 
reforms. 
158 
Office of the Electricity Regulator ("OFFER") "A Review of the Development of 
Competition in the Designated Electricity Market" (June 1999), 3 at 
<http://www.open.gov.uk/offer/index.htm> (last accessed 29 July 1999). 
159 
NSW unbundled its state-owned generator/national grid with the Electricity Transmission 
Authority Act 1995. Full retail competition was introduced on 1 July 1999. Victoria unbundled 
its generator/national grid with its Electricity Industry Act 1993 ; Queensland unbundled 
through the Electricity Act 1994 (and subsequent amendments) ; and ACT unbundled with the 
Electricity Supply Act 1997. Full retail competition in these three States will be available in 
January 2001. Ontario unbundled Ontario Hydro with the Energy Competition Act 1998 and 
retail competition will begin in 2000. 
160 
Energy Policy Act 1992. Some states, such as California, have introduced retail 
competition. 
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Norway however did everything at once - unbundling generation and 
transmission and permitting full retail competition from the same date. 161 
The second step is the introduction of competition in generation. This has 
almost always required the division of the major generator into a number of 
smaller generators, thereby removing market dominance. England and Wales 
initially created three generators out of the former monopoly, but as one of 
them generated more expensive nuclear power, this created a virtual duopoly in 
market terms. This decision caused significant problems and has led to a 
substantial rethink of the generation market. 162 Other regions learnt from this 
mistake and split their state-owned generator into more pieces - notably 
Victoria which split into five. 163 Ontario's recent reforms required Ontario 
Hydro to sell down its generation capacity to 35% over time. 164 
The third is creating a wholesale market for trading electricity (usually a spot 
market and in time a secondary futures market in hedge contracts). 165 As with 
the unbundling of generation and transmission, this has usually been an initial 
step. In England and Wales, the wholesale market commenced in 1990, the 
same year as the initial reforms. Norway's power pool was set up in 1991, one 
year after the initial reforms and has since expanded to include Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark. 166 In Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales the wholesale 
market was also created by the statutes implementing the original reforms. 167 
The fall in electricity prices in Victoria has been widely attributed to a 
161 Energy Act 1990. 
162 Due to a relatively dysfunctional spot market, the United Kingdom regulator has recently 
suggested that the market be abandoned in favour of a futures market in hedge contracts (as to 
the terminology, see nn 40 and 42): OFFER "A Review of Electricity Trading Arrangements: 
Proposals" (July 1998). This recommendation was accepted by the Government: White Paper 
on Energy Policy (8 October 1998). 
163 See Energy Projects Division (Victoria) Victoria's Electricity Supply Industry, Toward 2000 
(June 1997), 15 at <http://www.energy.dtf.vic.gov.au> (last accessed 20 August 1999). 164 See the Energy Competition Act 1998 and generally the Ontario Energy Board (the 
regulator) website: <http://www.oeb.gov.on.ca> (last accessed 25 August 1999). 
165 For the definition of a hedge contract see above n 40. 
166 Sweden was granted equal access in 1996; Finland in 1997 and Denmark in 1998. See 
Nordic Power Exchange ("NordPool") 1997 Annual Report, 1 (this is assuming that the 1998 
plan to include Denmark was successful) at <http://193.69.80.130/eng97/> (last accessed 26 
July 1999). 
167 For Victoria see Electricity Industry Act 1993; for Queensland see the Electricity Act 1994 
and for NSW see Electricity Supply Act 1995. 
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successful power pool. 168 A National Electricity Market began operating in 
Australia before small domestic customers from any State became 
contestable. 169 Generation competition is perhaps the most effective way of 
d . 11 . 170 re ucmg overa power pnces. 
The fourth step is establishing a number of new positions to manage the new 
system. A dispatcher is required to organise the physical dispatch of electricity 
to meet demand and is in charge of security of supply; a transmission provider 
is required to set the terms of access to the grid and collect revenue; and a 
market operator is needed to run the trading markets and settle imbalances 
between contracted and actual power flows. These positions can be combined 
and are logically independent from the actual owner of the grid.1
71 For 
instance, the National Electricity Market Management Company 
("NEMMCO") is both the dispatcher and market operator; but the national 
grids are still owned by the State grid companies. A complex agreement 
determines transmission terms.172 Again in Norway, the international power 
pool is regulated by a specialist company NordPool, while the grid remains 
publicly owned. 
The fifth step has usually been to inject corporate ethos into retail/distribution 
entities. This has often been done by forcing them to become legal companies. 
For instance all parts of the New South Wales and Queensland electricity 
system are state-owned corporations; Norway has corporatised its supply 
companies; and Ontario supply companies must incorporate by 2002. This 
result has also , but only in some cases, been effected by privatisation. The 
Victorian and United Kingdom systems are now totally privately owned. There 
168 Energy Projects Division (Victoria), above n 163 , 61. 
169 
The market has been running since 13 December 1998 and consists of NSW, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia and the ACT: See ACCC "What' s Happening in the Electricity 
Industry" ACCC Update, June 1999, 8 and the National Electricity Market Management 
Company website <www.nemmco.com.au> (last accessed 11 September 1999). See above n 
for the opening of Australian retail competition. 
170 
Trebilcock and Gal , above n 150, 13 . The generation part of an electricity bill accounts for 
around 45% of the total cost to the customer: see above n 51. 
171 
Although in practice the grid owner tends to be the dispatcher and the transmission provider: 
see for instance the United Kingdom National Grid Company. 
172 The National Electricity Code. 
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1s currently debate over whether New South Wales' assets should be 
· · d 173 pnvat1se . 
The sixth step is the introduction of retail competition for all consumers, 
usually gradually after giving generation competition time to become 
established. This has mostly been accompanied by some form of profiling as, 
without it, the costs of data reconciliation can effectively prevent competition 
for small customers. In Norway, for instance, high switching costs and the late 
introduction of profiling meant that the level of retail competition only rose to 
1.0% in 1997, seven years after the initial reforms. 174 The UK has introduced 
profiling at the same time as opening all customers to retail competition. 175 
Most Australian States expect full retail competition by January 2001. 
C How New Zealand Compares 
1 Similarities 
New Zealand has introduced all of these steps, although not in this order. The 
timing of the New Zealand reforms appears to provide an insight into why 
results have been slow to arrive. 
Until 1987, New Zealand had a variant of the monopoly model: the Crown 
owned the national grid and held a statutory monopoly on generation; 176 local 
ESAs held area franchises and were obliged to buy from the Crown. Thus 
although many entities were involved, the effect was still monopolistic. 177 
173 See Electricity Supply Association of Australia Ltd "The Electricity Privatisation Debate", 
Media Statement, 25 March 1999 at <http: //www.esaa.com.au/> (last accessed 20 June 1999). 
Privatisation was recommended in August 1997 by the NSW Committee of Inquiry into the 
Sale of Electricity Assets but did not get political support: see "Carr Dumps Electricity Sell-Off 
Plan" Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, Australia, 18 August 1998 at 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/9808/18/pageone /pageone I.html> (last accessed 20 June 
1999). 
174 International Energy Agency Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Norway - 1997 Review 
(October 1997), Table 2, 8 at <http: //www.iea.org/pubs/reviews/files> (last accessed 8 July 
1999); OFFER "Review of Trading Arrangements: Background Paper 2 - Electricity Trading 
Arrangements in Other Countries" (February I 998) para 7.29, figure 5. 
175 March 1999. See "Metering and Profiling", above n 53, 27. 
176 Electricity Act 1968, ss 25 and 26. 
177 Electricity Act 1968, s 20. 
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The government relinquished its generation monopoly in 1987. Independent 
generators could sell to any ESA. This seems consistent with the wholesale 
competition model. However this model did not really get started. The basic 
steps: unbundling transmission and generation; splitting the dominant generator 
and creating a wholesale market were introduced very late. From 1987 to 1994 
ECNZ continued to own the national grid (through a subsidiary). ECNZ also 
retained a practical monopoly on generation until 1996 when Contact was split 
and a wholesale market was created. 178 At this point ECNZ simply became the 
dominant generator. It could be fairly argued that genuine generation 
competition in New Zealand has only been possible since the 1998 ECNZ split. 
Counter to overseas examples, corporatisation was required by 1993 and full 
retail competition allowed in 1994, both years before wholesale competition 
had even begun. 179 Even with a wholesale market, domestic retail competition 
did not develop until deemed profiling was introduced on April 1999. Profiling 
or some other low-cost switching system was considered crucial in Norway and 
England and Wales to facilitate low-margin domestic retail competition. 
In other words, in both the generation and retail sectors, New Zealand allowed 
competition in theory years before providing the mechanisms for it to occur in 
practice. The relevant steps all occurred, but not in a logical order. 
2 Differences 
Aside from questions of timing, the New Zealand reforms have differed from 
their international counterparts in two crucial respects. The first is that all 
international reforms have involved an important seventh step: the 
establishment of an industry-specific regulator. The second is that none of the 
overseas reforms have required an ownership split of integrated line and supply 
companies. 
178 
The market was established by the industry. SOE Transpower is the dispatcher and 
transmission provider; the privately-owned Electricity Market Company is the market operator. 
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It is widely acknowledged elsewhere in the world that openmg up public 
electricity supply to competition must be done with safeguards for consumers. 
To ensure this, regulators were appointed with authority to control at least the 
natural monopoly parts of the industry. This step has accompanied reforms in 
England and Wales, Victoria, Queensland, New South Wales, Ontario and 
Norway. 
Such regulators have often been the key to ensuring that domestic consumers 
benefit from the restructuring. For example, in England and Wales, domestic 
prices fell by 11 % in real terms between 1989 and 1996 180 and another 10% 
between 1997 and 1999. 181 This was before domestic customers became 
contestable and despite an unsuccessful duopolistic spot market. These savings 
came largely from the price controls placed on line and supply charges since the 
beginning of the reforms. 182 Another example is Victoria where prices for non-
contestable domestic customers fell 9% in real terms since 1996 and are 
projected to fall another 13% by December 2000. 183 This has largely been due 
to the transmission price controls. 184 The Queensland regulator was given new 
powers in 1998 and the New South Wales regulator has recently ordered a new 
inquiry into price controls for network and franchise customer charges.185 
However, regulation is not simply about controlling prices. It is also about 
ensuring wider minimum standards. These can include social goals - such as 
179 Competition for domestic customers was possible from 1 April 1993 ; commercial and 
industrial customers one year later. 
180 United Kingdom Electricity Association "The United Kingdom Electricity System" (1996) at 
<http://www.electricity.org.uk> (last accessed 21 July 1999), 14. 
181 OFFER "A Review of the Development of Competition in the Designated Electricity 
Market" (June 1999), 16. See also OFFER "A Review of Domestic and Small Business Supply 
Price Regulation: A Consultation Document" (June 1999), 28. 
182 The method used by the regulator in England and Wales is the RPl-x method contemplated 
in the now abandoned Commerce (Controlled Goods or Services) Amendment Bill 1999, cl 
70(4). 
183 Energy Projects Division (Victoria) above n 163 , 61. 
184 See the Electricity Industry Supply Tariff Order (20 June 1995) made pursuant to s 158A of 
the Electricity Industry Act 1993. 
185 For Queensland, see Queensland Electricity Regulation Unit "Regulation Position Paper" 
(September 1997) at <http: //www.dme.qld.gov.au/energy/eru/ industry/reguaril.pdf> (last 
accessed 11 September 1999) and the corresponding amendments to the Electricity Act 1994. 
In NSW, the inquiry was announced by the regulator on 21 August 1999: see 
<http://ipart.nsw.gov.au/adverts/Elect210899.htm> (last accessed 11 September 1999). 
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guaranteed supply for the chronically sick and elderly; environmental goals -
such as use of a certain amount of renewable energy; and service goals - such as 
agreed disconnection procedures and a required range of payment options. 
These types of consumer safeguards have routinely been incorporated into 
overseas licenses required to distribute or retail electricity. 186 New Zealand not 
only has no regulator but, since the Electricity Act 1992, licenses are not 
required for any public electricity activity . 
Moreover, other countries have adopted a pragmatic approach to the advent of 
competition, protecting vulnerable customers from its harsher effects. For 
instance, while competition is now available to all consumers in England and 
Wales, supply (as well as lines) prices for small domestic customers remain 
controlled until 2000. This is because the DGES recognises that competition in 
h d ·1 187 t eory oes not necessar1 y protect customers. Until it proves itself 
sufficiently robust to do so, customers will be protected by regulation. This 
will also be the position after full retail competition is introduced in 
Queensland. 188 In Victoria, transmission charges are calculated with a cross-
subsidy in favour of rural customers to be phased out over 25 years. 189 In 
Norway, one of the aims of the reforms was to level different prices out, not 
move to a market-based user-pays system. 190 
New Zealand has an ability to introduce price caps for line charges to rural 
customers under the EIR Act19 1 and did attempt to bring in price control for 
lines companies generally this year. However two observations can be made. 
The first is that these measures were an afterthought to the New Zealand 
186 
These are required in England and Wales, Norway, Victoria, NSW, ACT and Ontario. See 
generally OFFER "Designated Electricity Market" above n 181 , 9-1 O; OFFER "Trading - Other 
Countries" above n 174, para 3.5; Energy Projects Division (Victoria) above n 163, 71 ; ACT 
"Licences" at <http://www.act.gov.au/electricity/> (last accessed 23 August 1999); Ontario 
Energy Board "Advisory Report on License Requirements for the Marketing of Natural Gas and 
Electricity" (6 October 1998). 
187 
OFFER "Domestic and Small Business Supply Regulation", above n 181 , 34. 
188 
Queensland Electricity Regulation Unit, above n 185, 19. 
189 
Tariff Order, above n 184, cl 4.6(b) and attch 7. Queensland and Ontario have similar 
policies on this point, see Queensland Electricity Regulation Unit, above n 185, 7; and Ontario 
Ministry for Trade and Development Direction for Change: Charting a Course for Competitive 
Electricity and Jobs in Ontario (November 1997), 9. 
190 "Metering and Profiling", above n 53 , 52 . 
191 EIR Act, s 88 . 
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reforms and have never actually been introduced. The second is that none of 
these measures extended to retail companies. The potential for retail 
competition alone is considered a sufficient deterrent against charging excessive 
rates or providing inadequate service. This may not be a valid assumption for 
undesirable customers, such as low income families, rural users and 
· 192 pens10ners. 
The second major difference between New Zealand and the rest of the world is 
that only New Zealand found it necessary to require a full ownership split of 
distribution/retail companies. Of course, to facilitate genuine retail 
competition, some split between the distribution and retail functions is required. 
There are however three types of possible split: an accounting split, where 
charges, costs and profits must be produced and disclosed separately for each 
business; a corporate split, where the two functions must be exercised by 
separate but affiliated companies; and an ownership split, where the two 
functions must be exercised by different companies. The rest of the world has 
chosen either an accounting split (Queensland, Victoria, New South Wales, 
Norway and England and Wales until 1999) and a corporate split (Ontario and 
England and Wales from 2000). 
The rest of the world has considered the costs of an ownership split (transaction 
costs and loss of scope economies) outweighed the gains (lack of need for 
conduct regulation). Largely this is because of the economics of electricity 
supply. The real benefits of overseas reforms have come from robust 
generation competition and careful regulation of transmission and distribution 
costs. The savings available from retail competition are, by contrast, extremely 
small. 193 Other countries have considered full ownership separation to be an 
excessive means of fixing a small problem. After all, whatever split is chosen, 
the retail competition model is already in place - this step is just to make it 
work more smoothly. 
192 In contrast, the United Kingdom regulator is closely monitoring how competition impacts on 
such "disadvantaged customers" : OFFER "Domestic and Small Business Supply Regulation" 
above n 181 , 37 and 50. 
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England and Wales provides an interesting example. The Hon M Bradford 
prematurely cited recent United Kingdom developments as supporting the New 
h 194 Zealand reform pat . This is not an accurate claim. There are major 
differences between the two countries. Firstly, the split recommended in the 
U . d K. d h. l 9s mte mg om was corporate, not owners 1p. The New Zealand 
government was advised that, if it required a physical split, it should select a 
corporate one.196 The government rejected this advice. 
Secondly, the 12 English/Welsh distribution/retail companies to be affected are 
all very large corporations. The added costs of corporate (let alone ownership) 
separation are far more easily absorbed by major companies with significant 
customer bases. The smallest English/Welsh company still has more than three 
times the amount of customers of New Zealand's largest EC; and hundreds of 
times the amount supplied by New Zealand ' s smallest EC.197 Thirdly, the 
major regulatory tool in the England and Wales is RPI-x price control. Thus 
any extra costs caused by the split could be placed on the companies 
themselves; not on consumers. There is no comparable protection in New 
Zealand. 
VI ANALYSIS 
This is the most important part of this paper. This section critiques the New 
Zealand government' s decision to implement the ownership split and highlights 
193 E . II d . . fi spec1a y to omest1c consumers. For the precise 1gures, see above n 54. 
194 
Hon M Bradford "UK Also Moves to Power Company Ownership Separation" Media 
Release, 21 June 1998. This was in response to OFFER "Reviews of Public Electricity 
Suppliers 1998 to 2000 - Separation of Businesses Consultation Paper" (May 1998) where the 
possibility of an ownership split was mooted. 
195 
The final recommendation contained in OFFER "Separation of Businesses : Proposals and 
Consultation" (May 1999) and was for a corporate split. 
196 See "Cabinet Committee 11 ", above n 96, 3. 
197 
The smallest distribution/retail company, SWALEC, had 970,000 customers in 1998 (a year 
before the corporate split was mooted) . The largest, Eastern, had 3,222,000. See OFFER 
"Reviews of Public Electricity Suppliers : 1998-2000 - Price Controls and Competition: 
Consultation Paper (July 1998), 7. By comparison, in 1998 the smallest New Zealand EC was 
Buller Electricity with 4,027 customers; and the largest was Mercury Energy with 251 ,155 
customers: Electricity Information Disclosure Statistics (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 
November 1998). Available at 
<http: //www.moc.govt.nz/ers/inf _disc/disclosure_ 1998/disclosure l 2.html#P23 7 _ 1519> (last 
accessed 24 August 1999) ["Disclosure Statistics"] . 
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the problems it has caused. The argument that the ownership split was bad 
policy is made in three stages: 
A. there was insufficient and poorly researched evidence of any problems 
the split could solve; 
B. even if there had been, the reasoning justifying the split was logically 
flawed; and 
C. the split has caused significant damage to the industry. 
A Insufficient and Poorly Researched Evidence of Problems 
The starting point for assessing whether the split was good or bad policy has 
already been stated in this paper. The ownership split was the most effective 
way of dealing with those problems it could solve. On the other hand, it was by 
far the most costly and traumatic way of addressing these problems. The only 
question is whether benefits of a strong solution outweighed the trauma it 
would cause. 
1 Insufficient evidence 
Obviously a key factor in this question is the gravity of the relevant problems. 
It is therefore interesting that one of the most notable features of the advice 
received by the Government is an almost complete lack of evidence that the 
problems actually existed. 
It will be recalled that the main problem inhibiting domestic retail competition 
were the transaction costs of reconciling energy flows. This problem was 
addressed by the introduction of deemed profiling. The remaining three 
problems were monopoly pricing by lines businesses; cross-subsidisation of 
potentially competitive activities; and incentives to restrict access. 
40 
It will also be recalled that the ownership split did not address potential for 
monopoly rents, which still exists in stand-alone lines companies. The 
ownership split simply eliminated the other two problems. The crucial question 
is then, how serious were two problems it eliminated? The answer all too 
apparent. 
The evidence showed only "very isolated evidence of cross-subsidies". 198 In 
fact, it appeared that on average, cross-subsidisation went backwards. Quite 
contrary to the theory that retail prices were kept artificially low with excess 
lines profits, evidence indicated that ECs were, if anything, doing the 
opposite. 199 This is important. The only real reason for assuming cross-
subsidisation to be a genuine concern was a simplified economic theory. On 
the facts cross-subsidisation, at the very least, did not reveal itself as a major 
issue. More likely, these figures show the government fundamentally 
misunderstood the real economies of running an average New Zealand 
electricity company. 
The evidence of access problems was no better. Officials acknowledged that 
no "explicit evidence of access problems" could even be found. 200 Access 
rates were provided at prices " 'less' than the Baumol-Willig rule",201 and it 
was widely agreed that electricity access problems were less significant than 
those seen in telecommunications. 202 The Commerce Commission had only 
received only two complaints about access to lines in the last six months of 
1997,
203 
"suggest[ing] that access may not be a major problem".204 Given that 
theoretical access issues arise in every integrated network/supply business, there 
was nothing particular to the electricity industry that cried out for attention. 
2 Crucial data ignored 
198 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3. 
199 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3 (emphasis added). 
200 
"Treasury Two", above n 58, 13. See also "Commerce Four" above n 31 19. 
201 ' ' "Treasury One", above n 46, 4. 
202 "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85 , 8. 
203 "Treasury Two", above n 58, 13. 
204 "Treasury Three", above n 68, 4. 
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In truth, one of the key reasons for ownership separation was to encourage 
smaller community-owned companies to vacate the competitive retail and 
generation sectors. Their incentives to do so in light of the four EIR Act 
options have already been discussed. 
There is strong evidence that the government believed community companies to 
be a major cause of the retail/distribution problems. Such companies were 
perceived as being less efficient than investor-owned companies and more 
likely to pass on excess costs to consumers. 205 Officials were keen move them 
into the non-competitive lines business where their prices could be controlled if 
necessary. 206 The EIR Act was drafted so as to make this result almost 
inevitable.207 
This bias against community companies was deeply rooted in history. Put 
bluntly, community companies were a mistake - an unexpected outcome of 
ESA corporatisation. The Energy Companies Act 1992 required ESAs to 
incorporate and distribute shares according to an "Establishment Plan" created 
by the new company and approved by the government. The government widely 
expected sales to private investors ( or in some cases local councils); or share 
give-aways to consumers, who would then on-sell to larger investors. 208 
Corporatisation was clearly intended as a prelude to privatisation. 
Contrary to this aim, a group of ESAs developed the innovative idea of selling 
their shares to a trust, which in tum would be owned by the local community. It 
was unclear for a number of months whether an Establishment Plan of this type 
would be acceptable to the government. A key consultant' s report 
recommended that a plan providing for 100% trust ownership "should lead to 
outright rejection" as it was "reminiscent of the old style power boards which 
the Government is trying to change".209 
205 See above n 90 and also nn 91-95 . 
206 See "OCEP Three", above n 64, 7; "Response to Review", above n 48, 5; "Treasury One", 
above n 46, 6. 
207 See the EIR Acts 46 and the comments in Hansard cited inn 130 above. 208 See Office of the Minister of Energy, above n 133. 
209 Wheeler Campbell Ltd "Establishment Plan Approval Criteria: Economic Issues" 
(November 1992), 25. 
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The government had certainly indicated as much and many directors of the new 
ECs were under the same impression. For instance, when Wairarapa Electricity 
sold its shares to private investors it justified this decision to consumers by 
stating that it had picked the only course open to it. 21 0 One EC director more 
poetically told a public meeting that hopes of a trust structure were simply a 
"dream". 2 11 These conclusions proved to be incorrect. The political delicacy of 
this issue compelled the government to grudgingly cave in.21 2 Directly after 
corporatisation, there were 44 ECs, exactly half of which were wholly 
· d 213 commuruty-owne . 
To return to the present, the ownership split was at least partly designed to 
reverse the earlier mistake.2 14 The 1998 arguments revived with vigour the 
1992 allegations that community-owned entities were not commercially 
viable.215 This time the problem would be fixed. The government's unmasked 
dislike of community companies is crucially important given that in 1998, 
community companies comprised 22 of the 35 ECs.21 6 
This agenda might not have been a problem if the government' s negative 
assertions about community companies had been true, or at least researched. 
The fact is they were neither. A little simple analysis shows that the 
210 The following paragraph appeared in an open newspaper article to consumers : "What does 
the Minister intend? It is clear that the Minister wants a commercial entity to control and 
operate electrical energy distribution ... Privatisation and the change to corporate structure are 
not voluntary decisions being made by Wairarapa Electricity; they have been imposed on the 
board by the Government.": "Wairarapa Electricity Draft Establishment Plan : Answers to Your 
Questions" Wairarapa Times-Age, Wairarapa, New Zealand, 23 October 1992, 8. 
211 Don Church, Director of Energy Ashburton to public meeting held on 28 November 1992 : 
"300 at Ashburton Meeting on Electricity Ownership" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 
29 November 1992. 
2 12 
'" Flexibility ' in Trust Ownership Accepted" The Press , Christchurch, New Zealand, 28 
August 1992. 
213 New Zealand Electricity Directory 1993, above n 34 . 
2 14 
This point is made by J Fitzsimmons, MP (Alliance) in the debates on the EIR Act. See (19 
May 1998) 568 NZPD 9161. 
2 15 
In 1992 A Neill, MP (National), Chairman of the select committee which oversaw the 
Energy Companies Act 1992 stated that "There is no doubt that trusts are a weaker form of 
ownership. History shows that trust-style ownership doesn't bring maximum efficiencies" : 
" 'Flexibility ' in Trust Ownership Accepted", above n 212 . See also Wheeler Campbell, above 
n 209, 5. These were precisely the criticisms levelled at trusts by government advisors prior to 
the 1998 reforms - compare comments in nn 90-95 above. 
216 New Zealand Electricity Directory 1998, above n 11. 
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government brusquely did away with the least profit-hungry, cheapest and most 
efficient ECs in New Zealand. 
The relevant statistics come from the mandatory disclosures collected by the 
Ministry of Commerce and cover the years 1995 to 1998 inclusive.217 A 
division of companies into those 100% community-owned ("community 
companies"); and those otherwise owned ("other companies") makes an 
interesting comparison.218 Firstly, community companies were content to make 
much less profit than their counterparts. Their accounting rates of return on 
assets for the four years were 4.00, 4.62, 4.83 and 4.89 per cent respectively 
compared with 7.48, 8.47, 9.48 and 10.29 per cent for the other companies.219 
This is roughly half the return taken by other companies. 
Secondly, community company prices were cheaper in each of the four years 
for all three classes of domestic customer (small, medium, and large). 220 
Thirdly, evidence indicates that community companies were more efficient. 
Their direct line costs ( expenditure directly relating to lines per kilometre 
divided by system length) were at least 40% less in all four years. 221 Their 
indirect line costs per customer (that is, administrative and other expenses) were 
also less: $99.57, $97.37, $101.60 and $90.14 respectively compared with 
$131.52, $121.29, $115.00 and $94.47.222 All of this is remarkable given that 
community-owned companies were all provincial and often supplied hard to 
reach rural areas with high distribution costs and few customers. The opposite 
would have been expected. The community companies' load factor (how 
217"Disclosure Statistics", above n 197. Statistics disclosed pursuant to the Electricity 
(Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994. 
218 The methodology used for this comparison is detailed in Appendix One. The location of 
community-companies is shown in Appendix Two and the statistics are contained in Appendix 
Three. It should be noted up front that Mercury Energy is counted as an other company on the 
grounds set out in Appendix One. 
219 The accounting return on equity was very similar. The accounting rate of profit for both 
groups also shows that community companies made less far profit. However the 1997 and 1998 
ARP means are distorted by ODV re-valuations of line businesses. For instance Mercury 
Energy's valuation in 1996 made the other companies' mean ARP leap from 5.83 in 1996 to 
10.90 in 1997. Eastland Electricity's revaluation made the community companies' mean ARP 
leap from 4.67 in 1997 to 13.92 in 1998. See Appendix Three, Tables 1-3. 
220 See Appendix Three, Table 4. 
221 See Appendix Three, Table 5. 
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efficiently they use their lines) and lines loss ratio were marginally worse, but 
consistent with providing long-range low-density rural service.
223 However, 
despite the difficult terrain, community companies had far less overall 
interruptions; and less faults per 100km of line in each year. 
224 
These statistics contradict government assumptions that community companies 
were inefficient. They in fact show the opposite: low-profit; low cost to 
customers; low business costs. The 1995-1997 statistics were available to the 
government when the key reform decisions were made but they do not appear to 
have been used to evaluate community company performance. 225 
Overall there was an incredible paucity of evidence indicating that the 
ownership split was necessary or even desirable. In fact evidence of cross-
subsidisation and access problems was laughably small; and evidence that 
community companies (which the split would tum into sole lines businesses) 
operated better than other companies, ignored. Intuitive ideological biases were 
allowed to prevail over hard facts. 226 
B Government Reasoning Logically Flawed 
The reasoning behind the ownership split can be criticised on at least six 
separate grounds. 
Firstly, the ownership split was unnecessary. The reason the electricity retail 
industry was singled out for further reform was that, despite full competition 
having been permitted since 1994, there was effectively a consumption limit for 
contestable customers. Only industrial users enjoyed competition. However 
the consumption limit was explained by the cost of the technology that allowed 
222 See Appendix Three, Table 6. 
223 See Appendix Three, Tables 7 and 8. Statistics only for 1997 and 1998. 
224 See Appendix Three, Tables 9 and 10. Statistics only for 1997 and 1998. 
225 
They were not referred to in any of the documents the author obtained under the Official 
Information Act 1982 from Treasury, Ministry of Commerce, the Cabinet Office or the OCEP. 
For a list, see Appendix Four. 
226 
In an accurate understatement, OCEP conceded that the "assessment by officials is mainly 
intuitive rather then empirical": "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 3. 
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industrial users to be contestable. Expensive time-of-use meters cancelled out 
the potential retail profits for most customers. Thus the problem was 
inadequate technology and the real reason there is competition today is the 
introduction of deemed profiling. There was no evidence linking the striking 
fact - no retail competition - to any issues an ownership split could solve. This 
was the half-baked musings of an ivory-towered economist. 
Secondly, the ownership split was grossly excessive for the minor and largely 
intuitive problems it could address ( cross-subsidisation and restrictive access). 
New Zealand had not yet implemented a strong accounting split - legally 
barring cross-subsidisation and requiring each business to be financially 
independent. It was clearly overkill to suddenly lurch to the most extreme form 
of separation. And as advisors repeatedly pointed out, ownership separation 
was not the only answer; the government had a host of less drastic options to 
choose from. 227 As Labour Energy Spokesperson Hon P Hogdson described it, 
the ownership split was "absolutely a sledgehammer to crack a nut". 228 
Thirdly, even following the government's reasoning, the ownership split was 
the wrong policy device. Although there was little evidence of monopoly 
pricing, this was the problem all officials rated the next most important issue 
behind inadequate technology. 229 Cross-subsidisation and access problems 
were not regarded as such significant problems, even in theory. Thus whatever 
measures the government adopted should have dealt with incentives and ability 
to charge monopoly rents. Indeed, monopoly rents and cross-subsidisation 
were not only theoretical problems, but they were also linked in theory. 
Preventing monopoly rents would also prevent cross-subsidisation, as it was 
only the excess line profits which allowed the subsidy to be made in the first 
place.230 
227 Including actual price control, better disclosure regulations and policing of them, better ODV 
methodology, government encouragement of industry standard use of system agreements. See 
above n 103 generally. 
228 (19 May 1998) 568 NZPD 9155. 
229 "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; "Commerce Three", above n 58, 1; "Treasury Eight", above 
n 98, 2; "OPEC Eight", above n 58, 1; "Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 4. 
230 "Treasury Nine", above n 86, 2; "Commerce Three", above n 85, 4; "Cabinet Committee 
Four", above n 85, 4 and 6; "Commerce Four", above n 31, 22; "Cabinet Committee One", 
above n 85, 10. 
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Astonishingly, the Government chose a course which only weakly addressed 
the monopoly rent problem; but blew the cross-subsidisation and access 
problems out of the water. This was internally inconsistent. The government 
tagged monopoly rents as the key remaining issue, but chose ownership 
separation as its key regulatory instrument. One might argue that the 
Government conceded this point by abandoning the threatened price control 
regime before it had been tried and belatedly trying to place all lines companies 
under actual price control in April 1999. 231 
The fourth flaw is that at least one genuine problem was never even addressed. 
This is regulation of Transpower' s- transmission charges. The 1998 reforms 
touched every sector of the industry save transmission. In continuing to ignore 
this issue, the government placed New Zealand even further behind the rest of 
the world which introduced transmission price controls at the very beginning of 
their reforms.232 Recall that regulation of transmission charges was not 
mentioned in the key policy advice nor contemplated by the 1998 threatened 
price controls. Yet, Transpower' s pricing has been a major issue for a number 
of years. Immediately after the 1998 reforms, excessive pricing complaints 
resulted in major litigation which ended (without remedy) in Court of Appeal in 
August this year.233 
Fifthly, the ownership split precipitated a direct transfer of wealth from small 
communities to large newcomers. The retail release of the four SOE generators 
at the same time ensured that the State received a slice of the pie. Not only was 
this arguably unfair; it was also oddly anti-competitive. The large players could 
231 It was simply too late for such controversial legislation. The EIR Act itself was only passed 
as a confidence motion, under urgency, and with a two-week window for select committee 
submissions. 
232 
Examples include England and Wales, Queensland, Victoria, NSW, ACT, Ontario and 
Norway. 
233 
See Mercury Energy Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd (1998) 8 TCLR 554 (decided on 
18 December 1998) and its appeal Vector Ltd (formerly Mercury Energy Ltd) v Transpower (31 
August 1998) CA32/99. The Court of Appeal decided that the prime necessities doctrine (a 
common law basis for challenging monopoly rents) has been superseded by the Commerce Act 
1980. The High Court had already found that s 36 of this Act did not prevent Trans power from 
charging monopoly rents and this was not challenged on appeal. See also Richard Tweedie, 
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and did buy clusters of domestic customers outright. This meant that these new 
or expanding companies were not forced to lower their prices to a fiercely 
competitive level to enter the market. They simply purchased the market. New 
Zealand's six "competitive" genrets began life with plenty of customers and 
significant costs to recoup. 
Finally, and most importantly, the ownership split removed the only form of 
consumer protection many domestic customers had and replaced it with 
nothing. This refers to the effective removal of community-owned companies 
from the competitive sectors. Such companies were, as the statistics show, not 
profit-driven, low priced and efficient. However their real benefit was their 
community-ownership. Quite by chance, New Zealand had stumbled onto a 
truly effective structure for supplying electricity to low-margin, commercially 
unattractive places. 
Put simply, community ownership (especially a trust whose beneficiaries were 
defined as power consumers) gave consumers a natural hedge against high 
power prices. If the EC listened to community pressure and kept prices low, the 
result was low prices. And indeed this was the usual state of events. However 
if the EC raised prices to gain profits, then the trust as shareholder could expect 
a bigger dividend, which was then rebated back to consumers (usually as a 
discount off their power bill). If the EC made money, so did the consumer. 
Thus an EC could not fleece its customers other than by being inefficient. And 
the statistics show that community companies were generally more efficient 
than other companies. 
The government was well aware of this structural advantage but, somehow 
managed to twist it into a reason why trusts should be removed. The 
Government decided that this feature made trusts anti-competitive. The 
following quote says it all: 234 
CEO Todd Energy "Getting a Fair deal From Monopolies" MEUG Seminar, above n 147, 7 
who identified Transpower as "Villain No. I [for] excessive and illogical pricing". 
Trusts which own retail businesses are able to out-compete new 
entrant retailers by (i) providing rebates to customers except those 
who switch suppliers, and/or by (ii) offering lower prices to 
customers because they are willing to take lower rates of return than 
private sector retailers. The rebates and/or lower prices offered by 
trust-owned EPCs may be enhanced by special tax treatment available 
to trusts. Trust ownership can cause less retail competition that 
would otherwise occur. 
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This argues that trust-owned companies will be able to stifle competition by 
returning their profits to consumers and by seeking less profit in the first place -
as well as having tax advantages. In other words they are cheap. To anyone 
not obsessed with privatisation, this is a good thing. However to the 
government, this very point counts against community companies. The 
argument is ludicrous. If investor-owned companies could not deliver lower 
prices to customers of community companies, why on earth force customers to 
buy from them? And here is the real flaw of ownership separation. Trusts 
weren't anti-competitive - they were super-competitive. The government was 
just hopelessly biased against them. 
If it were not such a tragic mistake it would be funny. But there is one last 
twist. Not only did the government effectively prevent trusts from competing 
with newcomers, the regions supplied by community companies were never 
likely to get any competition at all. So community consumers faced a double 
wharnmy. There is a simple reason why. As stated, the net retail profit per 
customer per annum is between 3% and 6% of the total bill, or $50 per 
annum.235 No one in the electricity industry seriously believed that there were 
any substantial savings to be made in the domestic retail sector. International 
experience backs this up - the savings have come from wholesale competition 
and controlled transmission and distribution charges. 
234 
"Cabinet Committee Four", above n 85, 9. This argument was accepted by Cabinet in 
"Cabinet One", above n 93, 4. 
235 See above nn 54 and 55 . 
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This industry adage applies a fortiori to provincial and rural regions. 236 
Ironically, it was these areas in which community companies were based. The 
largest customer base supplied by a community company was only 56,000;237 
and the average was only 20,000.238 Community companies did not supply to 
any main centres and covered most of the rural landscape of New Zealand.239 
Their customers were commercially unattractive. The replacement of 
community companies with a promise of competition for provincial New 
Zealand was not even sound in theory, let alone in practice. 
C Outcome 
Given the flawed reasoning behinoownership separation, the problems it has 
caused are not wholly surprising. These problems fall into broadly two groups: 
wholesale problems and retail problems. 
I Wholesale problems 
The result of the ownership split was of course a transfer of almost all of New 
Zealand's retail and small generation interests from 35 locally-based companies 
to a cabal of six new genrets. These new genrets varied in their amount of 
generation capacity and customer bases but attempted to broadly match the two. 
This was obviously a wise business strategy as it avoided relying heavily on 
fluctuating wholesale prices to supply customers. It was also a strategy with the 
potential to warp the newly competitive wholesale market. 
The market was set up m 1996 and divided participants into three classes: 
generators; purchasers; and traders (which represented groups of small 
purchasers - no longer really necessary). The wholesale price is determined 
every half hour by the most expensive unit of generated electricity necessary to 
236 The CEOs of Otago Power and Central Electric stated this year that they did not believe rural 
customers will see any competition at all due to the extremely low rural margin: "Power to the 
People" Otago Daily Times, Dunedin,. New Zealand, 7 April 1999, 23. 
237Hawkes Bay Power. Figures from the Disclosure Regulations, see above n 197. 
238 Figures from the Disclosure Regulations, see above n 197. Mercury Energy is excluded 
from this figure on the grounds set out in Appendix One. 
239 See Appendix Two. 
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meet demand. A premise of the market is the supply/demand curve fixed by the 
differing interests of the generators on the one side and the purchasers on the 
other. Now, however, every major generator is also a major purchaser. And 
there are only six major players in total. 
The potential for the wholesale electricity market to come to resemble the 
comfortable oligopoly of the four oil wholesalers after deregulation in 1988 is 
ominous. Indeed a standard economics text describes a market as an oligopoly 
if "the number of sellers is small, but greater than one, and if strategic 
interactions among sellers are important".240 Where all sellers are also buyers, 
strategic interactions become very important. It is currently too early to tell 
whether competitive or merely reactive bidding will come to characterise the 
New Zealand market. The amount of new players has so far led to a general 
drop in wholesale prices. 241 It has yet to be seen whether this will be a long 
term and significant trend. The point is that such vertical-integration should 
not have been permitted, let alone encouraged, in the first place. This was a 
problem which so concerned the United Kingdom regulator that in 1995 it 
prevented the two large generators (respectively) from gaining significant 
shares of the retail market. 242 
2 Retail problems 
The 1998 reforms have been successful in introducing domestic retail 
competition. This is mainly due to the introduction of deemed profiling and the 
retail entry of the four SOE generators. 
240 William Sharkey The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1982), 1. 
241 
These dropped by 2.4% between June 1998 and June 1999. See Statistics New Zealand 
"Quarterly New Zealand Energy Statistics - June 1999 quarter" Media Release, 1 September 
1999 (see annexed tables) at 
<http: //www.stats .govt.nzlstatsweb.nsf/525l8ce3e01 f62f4cc256388000c48cO?Open View> 
(last accessed 8 September 1999). 
242 
National Power pie proposed to merge with Southern Electric pie on 2 October 1995 . 
PowerGen pie proposed to merge with Midlands Electric pie on 18 September 1995 . Both 
mergers were prevented by the DGES and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. See 
"Recent Developments in the UK Electricity Industry" EU & Competition Law Newsletter 
(July 1996) at 
<http://www.lovellwhitedurrant.com/NewSite/PUBS/EU MON/JUNE 1996/EM 16.HTM> 
(last accessed 8 July 1999). - -
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However, competition has not yet delivered lower prices. Nationally, prices for 
domestic customers increased by 3.8% over the quarter from March to June 
1999. 243 This is despite the fact that average wholesale electricity prices have 
dropped by 1.4% in the same period. 
In short, the predicted $40-1 OOm of efficiency savings has not materialised. 244 
Even in theory, the only real savings available from domestic customers were in 
urban centres where large economies of scale left some room to cut costs but 
maintain profits. But urban prices have remained basically static. Immediately 
following the reforms, TransAlta and First Electric raised prices in Wellington, 
Auckland and Christchurch - TransAlta' s increases were of up to 10%. 245 The 
ensuing competition has - at best - cancelled these rises. At 1 September 1999, 
the best offer for an average Wellington domestic consumer was a 2% saving 
on its December 1998 bill. 246 Figures suggest that some companies are not 
genuinely competing for domestic customers outside the regions they 
purchased. Meridian Energy is (nationally) merely offering to match existing 
prices. Contact Energy 's domestic prices in Wellington are 5% higher than the 
. 1 . 247 most expenszve a ternative. 
Predictably, the areas hit hardest were provincial and rural. Competition for 
such customers is basically non-existent. At 1 September 1999 only one of the 
21 former community-owned EC customers had a permanent alternative offer at 
all, and in this region the alternative offer was still 4% higher than that enjoyed 
243 Statistics New Zealand, above n 241 , see annexed tables. Interestingly, prices for 
commercial customers dropped I. I% in the March-June quarter (same source). 
244 This figure was estimated by the Ministry of Commerce: "Commerce Three", above n 58, 1-
2. 
245 See "Cheaper Power Plan in Tatters" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 7 April 
1999, 1; "Failed Bid Raises Prices" Sunday Star Tim es, Auckland, New Zealand, 11 April 1999, 
El. 
246 For an average domestic consumer using 8000kWh pa on a controlled hot water plan, 
TransAlta at 5 December 1998 would cost $950.85 pa. At l September 1999, TransAlta would 
cost $1059.58 pa; Contact $1113.39 pa; and First Electric $932.34 pa. Meridian's standing 
offer was simply to match existing prices. All figures include GST and were obtained direct 
from the companies concerned. 
247 This is comparing TransAlta's Everyday Saver Plan to Contact ' s Driven Energy Plan - both 
equivalent controlled hot water plans. For the figures , see above n 246. 
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before the reforms.248 As early as March 1999 (before the reforms truly kicked 
in) prices for former community customers had risen on average by just under 
2%.249 This included a 32% price rise by King Country Energy, formerly the 
cheapest EC in New Zealand.250 Similar price rises have continued. 
Trustpower raised its prices in former community company areas - Otago, the 
Bay of Plenty and Marlborough (the latter by 16% ), but not in areas it had 
supplied before the reforms - Tauranga, Rotorua or Tau po. 251 On 19 July 1999, 
Meridian raised its prices in Waitaki by a whopping 38%.252 
These nses were not wholly unexpected given that community companies 
satisfied with a 4% margin were generally being replaced by large corporations 
with significant debt and a desire for a commercial rate of return. These 
corporations have to both recoup their purchases and achieve their required 
profit somehow.253 All of the six large genrets made significant outlays, 
especially Trustpower and TransAlta,254 and Edison Mission Energy famously 
paid $1.2b for a 40% stake in Contact Energy. 255 These outlays were widely 
expected to offset potential efficiency savings. 25 6 
248 Consumer Powerswitch Database, above n 130. Meridian's offer to give consumers who 
switched to it during August and September 1999 a discounted subscription to Sky TV but keep 
power prices the same is not counted, as it was a temporary offer and it did not reduce power 
prices (as to the offer, see <http: //www.skytv.co.nzJmeridian .html> [last accessed 2 September 
1999]). The only former community company region to have any permanent competition at all 
is Marlborough . However Meridian ' s Marlborough prices (as the new competitor) at I 
September are still 4% higher than those offered by Marlborough Electric in March 1999 : 
figures provided by Marlborough Lines. See generally Part VII. (NB on the grounds set out 
in Appendix One, the figure of21 community companies excludes Mercury Energy) . 
249 The precise figure was 1.87%: Ministry of Commerce "Schedule of Domestic Electricity 
Prices", above n 144. 
250 Ministry of Commerce "Schedule", above n 144. In 1997 Consumer magazine recorded 
King Country as offering the lowest domestic power charges : "Power to the People" 357 
Consumer March 1997, 7. 
25 1 "Trustpower Putting Prices Up" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, I May 1999, 2. 
252 Figures supplied by Waitaki Lines, 23 August 1999. 
253 See "Power Bills May Soar Despite Reform" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 
29 March 1999, 12. 
254 Both attracted personal criticism from the Hon M Bradford for paying high prices for 
generation assets and customers: see "Retailers Blasted Over Prices", The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 1 April 1999, 15 (criticism directed at Trustpower); and "Bradford 
Bullish on Power Charge" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 29 December 1998, 
C 1 (this latter article discloses that TransAlta apparently paid $64 7 per customer for Power 
New Zealand ' s customer base and $1001 per customer for Southpower's) . 
255 
This was apparently twice the price expected: "Huge Windfall From Contact Sale" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 23 March 1999, I. 
256 
See comments of Jeff Williams, CEO Trustpower and industry analysts reported in "Power 
Bills May Soar Despite Reform" above n 253. 
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Purchase costs were additional to the costs of separating naturally connected 
activities and losing economies of scope. Thus in some areas both lines and 
retail charges have increased. 257 Some sole lines business claim to have been 
forced to raise prices to retain the same rate of return - a fact which the 
Ministry of Commerce predicted, when it noted that ECs on average subsidised 
line costs with generation and retail profits.258 
The privatisation or nationalisation of local power companies has eliminated the 
financial protection offered by community ownership. King Country Energy 
provides a good example of the result. This year, King Country Energy 
drastically increased its prices (by 32%) and the King Country Power Trust sold 
down its 100% shareholding to 10%. 259 The other shares were largely 
distributed to private investors and King Country customers.260 As with most 
share give-aways, many customers have sold their shares.26 1 These customers 
have thus gone from enjoying the lowest electricity prices in the country whilst 
having excess power company profits rebated as discounts off their electricity 
bill, to paying high prices and being wholly vulnerable to any future rises. 
Of course financial benefit is not the only or even the principal benefit of 
community ownership. Although it was not mentioned in any of the reports 
prior to the EIR Act, the local power company - which had generally been 
around for upwards of 70 years - was a prized asset. Amid post office closures, 
bank relocations and a general decline in prosperity, the local EC was property 
that the community had fought to own in 1992 and had won. It was one of the 
few things Buller, for instance, needed that was still operated from Buller. 
Almost every province m New Zealand is now supplied electricity by a 
company based thousands of kilometres away. When Central Otago 
experienced power failures in the bitter July 1999 winter they had to ring 
257 This occurred, for example in Waitaki and Marlborough. 
258 "Commerce Three", above n 58, 3. 
259 On 11 July 1999. Information provided by King Country Energy on 25 August 1999. 
260 Waitomo Energy Services Customer Trust received an 8% shareholding. 
26 1 Information provided by King Country Energy on 25 August 1999. 
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Trustpower in Tauranga to try to get reconnected. It is reported that many 
Trustpower telephonists did not know the location of some of the affected 
areas. The competitive alternatives to the new incumbent, where they exist, are 
no closer. First Electric for instance is serviced by a call centre in Melbourne. 
Further, it is a sad fact that the communities which chose to sell their supply 
businesses were often deeply fractured by the process. Many residents thought 
the EC should have held onto the local assets - especially when they included 
local generation plants - whatever the financial consequences. Many public 
meetings and angry letters to local newspapers were written. Sides were taken. 
In one case the protest went all the way to the Court of Appeal. 
262 ECs 
themselves spent significant amounts of unnecessary money on consultants, 
lobbying MPs and informing their communities of the changes. 
In context, the gains to be made from the ownership split would have had to 
have been huge to justify abruptly reversing the 1992 reforms and effectively 
divesting these newly created, and much valued, local companies. No such 
gains were to be had. Instead significant loss and fracture has been caused, 
especially in rural areas. The bottom line is that this result was not necessary. 
Ownership separation was not responsible for the introduction of competition; 
this was the work of other policy devices. The split merely created a swathe of 
added costs which have ironically cancelled out the effects of competition for 
those lucky domestic customers who enjoy it. 
VII CASE STUDY: MARLBOROUGH ELECTRIC LTD 
Marlborough Electric Limited ("ME"), supplier to the Marlborough region until 
1999, makes an interesting case study for three reasons. The first is that ME 
supplied 19804 customers in 1998, almost precisely the average for a 
community company.
263 The second is ME was instrumental in developing the 
community trust model. The third is that ME's decision to sell its supply 
262 See Part VII for a case study of this region. 
263 Of 20000 . See above n 238 . 
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business to Trustpower in April 1999 was challenged as far as the Court of 
Appeal.264 
ME began life as the Marlborough Electric Power Board ("MEPB") which was 
established by proclamation on 24 October 1923. This did not enable MEPB to 
supply electricity to the public for the simple reason that there were no nearby 
generators and no transmission grid. So the MEPB obtained government 
consent to built its own generator, the Waihopi Power Scheme, which was 
completed in 1927. Initially the station provided 1 MW of electricity and was 
intended to supply both Blenheim and the surrounding province.265 This 
became unrealistic as demand grew, but the plant was updated in 1930 and 
1937. 
It was not until 1944 that Marlborough was connected to outside supply.266 
Marlborough continued to invest in local power. In 1983 it opened a new 
power scheme, Branch Hydro, which since this date has supplied power at less 
cost than energy delivered over the National Grid;267 and in 1996 it overhauled 
the Waihopi station replacing the generator and turbine. Marlborough also 
invested heavily in reticulating its power district. 268 This was no mean feat: the 
Marlborough Sounds was one of the most difficult regions actually reticulated. 
Many places were only accessible on foot; and some only by boat. 
Given this history of isolated community endeavour, it was unsurprising that 
when power boards were corporatised in 1992 most Marlburians felt a moral 
claim to ownership of the local electricity assets. As has been noted, the 
Government had not even contemplated the prospect of corporatisation 
resulting in community ownership. This idea actually came from two MEPB 
264 See Radley v Cuddan (29 March 1999) unreported, High Court, Blenheim Registry, CP3/99 
and Cuddan v Radley (31 March 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 67/99. 
265 Marlborough Electric "Waihopi Power Scheme: 1927 to 1997 and Beyond" (Blenheim, 
Marlborough Electric, 1997) ["Waihopi Power Scheme"], I. 
266 The first link was to the Cobb Dam in 1944. Marlborough was connected to the South Island 
Grid in 1954. 
267 Affidavit of Kenneth John Forrest, 24 March 1999: Radley v Cuddan, para 15 ["Forrest 
Affidavit"]. 
268 With the aid of funding from the Rural Reticulation Council. 
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officers, Kenneth Forrest and Peter Radich,269 who sought legal advice and then 
the support of other power companies. 270 Thus it was the new company, ME, 
which led development of the company/trust concept. 
ME was eventually successful. Its Establishment Plan, and many similar to it, 
was accepted and enabled it to vest all its shares in a trust (the Marlborough 
Electric Power Trust ["MEPT"]) for the community. The Trust Deed deemed 
current customers of ME to be the trust beneficiaries and stated that the object 
of the trust was to hold ME' s shares on behalf of such customers and to 
distribute the benefits of share ownership back to them.27 1 The Deed provided 
for an ownership review to take place between April 1998 and April 1999. 272 
Time rolled on. Between 1994 and 1998 ME was a successful company with 
prices below the national average. In every year it was able to deliver tax-paid 
dividends or rebates to the trust. The average discount off domestic electricity 
bills for this period was $60.273 In 1998 ME supplied 26% of Marlborough' s 
electricity and aimed to be a self-sufficient generator by 2007 .274 To this end, 
ME investigated alternative generation projects, including wind generation.275 
The 1998 Annual Report states that "Self-sufficiency would provide an 
effective long-term buffer against increases in wholesale electricity prices".276 
Then came the 1998 ownership split. ME violently opposed it and organised a 
group of community-companies in opposition to the legislation. 277 The 
269 General Manger and Chairman respectively of MEPB ; Managing Director and Chairman 
respectively of ME. 
270 
Affidavit of Peter Joseph Radich, 24 March 1999, Radley v Cuddon, paras 13 and 15 
["Radich Affidavit"]. 
27 1 
Marlborough Electric Power Trust Deed, 28 April 1993, I (General Purposes) ["Trust 
Deed"]. 
272 "Trust Deed", above n 2 71 , cl 4 . 
273 Figures supplied by Marlborough Lines: 13 August 1999. 
274 "Forrest Affidavit", above n 267, paras 24 and 42. 
275 
Such as ECNZ's Coleridge Scheme and (with Tasman Energy) the Cobb Scheme: "Forrest 
Affidavit", above n, 267, para 22. 
276 
Marlborough Electric Annual Report 1998, 10 ["Annual Report" ]. Many other 
geographically isolated ECs had invested in local generation. Notable examples include Top 
Energy and Northpower (Northland), Bay of Plenty, Central Power and Wairarapa Electricity 
(Wairarapa), King Country, Alpine Energy (Canterbury) and Central Electric (Otago) . 
277 
"Community Companies Submission", above n 51. See also Marlborough Lines Directors ' 
Interim Ownership Review Report to Trustees (June 1999), 11 ["Ownership Review" ]. 
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company and trustees were tom as to what to do. On one hand, ME had been 
instrumental in establishing community ownership in 1992 and saw itself as a 
community enterprise; on the other, the commercial disincentives of a trust 
supply business were stark. 
The company and the trust sought advice for several months and in February 
1999 came to a provisional decision to sell. This was advertised in the local 
paper on 10 February and invited submissions. The Marlborough public was 
highly concerned and generally opposed the sale. Between 11 February and 22 
February 6700 signatures were collected for a petition to this effect.278 This 
was significant for a population the size of Marlborough in such a short time. 
It was all to no avail. The final decision to sell the generation and retail 
businesses was taken on 23 February 1999 with trustee approval. 279 On 19 
March 1999, a local resident, Mr Gordon Rodley, sought an interim injunction 
to prevent the sale on the grounds that ( 1) the trustees ' approval was required 
for the sale to be effective; and (2) the trustees could not validly give approval 
as to do so would be a breach of trust. Mr Rodley succeeded a week later in the 
High Court but lost in the Court of Appeal. 280 
The first limb of the argument was based on section 77 of the EIR Act which 
applies where the "managers" of an entity have to obtain the approval of a 
group in order to select an ownership separation option. Where this is the case, 
the managers must take reasonable steps to choose the most acceptable option. 
It was argued that the sale agreement was a major transaction in terms of 
section 129 of the Companies Act 1993 and so required shareholder approval 
from the trust. 281 As the 1998 book value of the supply assets was 63% of 
ME' s net assets,282 the High Court agreed that section 77 applied. 
278 Affidavit of Gerald Patrick Thomas Hey, 23 March 1999: Radley v Cuddon, para I 5 ["Hey 
Affidavit" ]. 
279 "Hey Affidavit", above n 278 , para 17. 
28° For the case citations, see above n 264. 
281 Section 129 defines a major transaction as, amongst other things, an agreement to dispose of 
assets of the company the value of which is more than hal f the asset value before the 
disposition: s 129(2)(b) . 
282 Annual Rep ort, above n 276, 29. 
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Mr Rodley then argued that the sale was not an "acceptable option" pursuant to 
section 77 as it required the trustees to act in breach of trust. This was the key 
argument. Mr Rodley asserted that the fundamental purpose of the trust was to 
retain community ownership of the core assets of ME, at least pending a 
contrary ownership review. This was why the trust had been set up in the first 
place. This purpose was not explicitly stated in the Trust deed but was "so 
obvious ... that it goes without saying".283 If this were so, the trustees had no 
power to agree to the company selling half its business. Wild J in the High 
Court thought both limbs seriously arguable and granted the interim injunction. 
The trustees immediately appealed ro the Court of Appeal and, in light of the 
urgency of the case, were granted a hearing two days later on 31 March. The 
Court of Appeal ruled firstly that section 77 did not apply as a major transaction 
is defined by the market, rather than book, value of the relevant assets. 
Secondly, and most importantly, the Court of Appeal ruled there had been no 
breach of trust. Looking at the words in the Trust Deed it was clear that the 
company owned the assets and the trust merely owned shares in the company. 
The trust did not own any assets at all. There was no breach of trust because 
the community got to keep all it had ever owned since 1992 - shares in an 
energy company. 
This decision highlighted the crucial way in which the company/trust structure 
differed from the old power boards. The community had swapped assets for 
shares in the owner of those assets. The Court of Appeal ruling made it clear 
that people who thought the company/trust model was meant to preserve the 
electricity infrastructure built up over generations were incorrect. It was simply 
meant to preserve a shareholding. 
This possibly accorded with the 1992 government's wider privatisation goals 
and may have been the reason why references to assets were all but excluded 
283 Radley v Cuddon, above n 264, 18. 
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from the ME trust deed.284 But it did not accord with what communities 
thought they were getting with a community trust. Indeed, an ME pamphlet 
distributed in late 1992 stated that "like all companies the assets will be owned 
by its shareholders".285 Conflation of assets with shares is an easy thing to do. 
Only a lawyer naturally separates the two. 
Just over one month later, Trustpower raised power prices by roughly 16%. 
Marlborough has, however, been lucky. It is one of the very few provincial 
regions to have permanent competition. Meridian, one of the ECNZ babies, 
arrived in June 1999.286 Unfortunately, Meridian's lowest offer is still at least 
4% higher than that offered by ME in April 1999.287 And this figure includes 
the $100 rebate still paid by the MEPT to consumers. If this is excluded, the 
increase is 14%.288 
Marlborough Electric is now a lines company, Marlborough Lines ("ML"). It 
and the trust's relationship with consumers has suffered. The short-lived 
litigation may be over, but its divisive effects are not. Some irate consumers 
were still petitioning Parliament to dismiss trustees in July 1999. The 
ownership review finally began in August 1999. The directors' report to 
trustees recalls the history of ME from the early 1980s to 1998 as a period when 
"the company had the unwavering support of its community". 289 By contrast 
they state that, following the reforms: 290 
The confusion and anger which we predicted has arisen . All who 
have had anything to do with the reform process have been damaged 
284"Radich Affidavit", above n 270, paras 31-36. 
285 Marlborough Electric "Marlborough Electric Draft Establishment Plan : A Summary" ( 1992), 
2. Another pamphlet asks "who has paid for the assets in the past?" and answers "the 
customers" : Marlborough Electric "What's Happening to Your Power Board" ( 1992), 1. 
286 It is rumoured that political pressure from much lobbied MP Hon Speaker Doug Kidd was 
behind Meridian ' s only permanent foray outside its own customer zones. This is perhaps 
fuelled by the picture on Meridian ' s press release of Hon Doug Kidd and Meridian 's managing 
director signing documents in Parliament: See "Meridian Energy Brings Electricity Choice to 
Marlborough" Press Release 27 May 1999 at 
<http: //www.meridianenergy.co.nz/news.htm> (last accessed 11 September 1999). 
287 Figures supplied by Marlborough Lines and Powerswitch (see above n 136). Calculation 
valid at 13 August 1999. Worked out for an 8000kWh user on a controlled 13 hour plan. 
288 This was the 1998 rebate. Figures: Marlborough Lines, 13 August 1999. 
289 Ownership Review, above n 277, 10. 
by anger and criticism. While we within Marlborough Lines have 
done everything possible to stop the reform process we have been 
seen as not having done enough. The confusion has resulted in 
criticism which has been misdirected. 
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The Directors recommended that the trust structure be continued "in the 
meantime at least".291 This equivocation is a sharp change from the tone of 
Annual Report published only a year before. 292 A concurrent 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Report opined that the value of trusts as price 
protection devices has now been substantially eroded. 293 It recommended that 
the trust shares be distributed directly to consumers. 294 If this is adopted it will 
be the end of a long tradition. In 1927, the MEPB wrote that: 295 
The Board has only to pay its way, and therefore is on a position to 
distribute electricity without looking for a profit. In the course of a 
few years profits will accrue, but these will be handed back to the 
consumers, in one way or another - either by increasing facilities, or 
by reducing the price charged for the current. 
This was a also a fairly accurate description of ME between 1993 and 1999. It 
certainly no longer describes power supply in Marlborough. 
VIII DEEPER LESSONS 
Ownership separation was an elegant solution to a theoretical problem. From a 
certain perspective one can see its academic appeal. After all, the retail 
competition model is premised on separating the delivery of electricity from the 
electricity itself. If these two functions need to be separated in some way, why 
not do the job properly and create an ideal market structure rather than having 
to constantly regulate to ensure fair play. New Zealand, in its commitment to 
290 Ownership Review, above n 277, 13. 
291 Ownership Review, above n 277, 31. 
292 Annual Report, above n 276, 14. 
293 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Marlborough Lines: Ownership Review (June 1999) 3. 
m ' PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 293, 44. 
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light-handed regulation, was a firm proponent of "structural" regulation. 
Therefore, ownership separation made perfect sense. 
The problem with this argument is that it is far too abstract. It could have been 
made about any electricity system in the world; in fact it could have been made 
about any commodity at all. 
Although modem thinking and technology have demonstrated that electricity is 
a commodity which can be sold competitively in a wholesale market and then 
again to consumers, it is nonetheless a unique commodity. Neither modem 
thinking nor modem practice indicate it can be traded effectively in the same 
structure that works best for, say, -baked beans. And this is the difference 
between overseas restructuring and New Zealand deregulation. 
Other restructured electricity systems appear superficially identical. 
Monopolies are being disaggregated, markets are being created and competition 
is being introduced. But there are significant differences. Firstly, the ideology 
is different. Competition, although the main tool used in lowering prices, is not 
the only tool. The introduction of market forces has ironically led to a revival 
of heavy regulation to control natural monopolies. Transmission and 
distribution licenses, sophisticated price control systems and an intrusive 
independent regulator have aggressively prevented the extraction of monopoly 
rents. And it is from here that a significant volume of overall savings have 
come. New Zealand initially rejected actual price control of lines companies, 
and did not even consider regulating transmission charges. 
Further, most other countries have been more sceptical of the wonders of 
competition. They are aware that a potentially competitive market can fail to 
deliver low prices to all consumers; just as an inefficient monopoly market can 
do so.296 Given this fact - and the paramount importance of electricity - most 
overseas regions have controlled even potentially competitive businesses in 
295 Marlborough Electric Power Board "Harnessing the Waihopi", (Marlborough, 6 August 
1927), I. 
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some way. Thus retail licenses controlling standards are common and vertical-
integration between generators and retailers has been monitored. Price controls 
have also been used where the benefits of competition have not proven 
themselves sufficient protection. In the words of John Bridgman, the United 
Kingdom Director-General of Fair Trading:297 
... basic competition law .. . was primarily intended to protect small 
businesses against the large, not the consumer against business . But 
today there is a new consciousness of the vulnerability of the 
consumer. The awareness that regulation and competition law is 
there to protect the consumer from business rather than businesses 
from each other, has certainly come to stay. 
This consciousness is a logical result of realising that competition and lower 
prices, while undoubtedly related, are not necessarily the same thing. In the 
end, there are always some customers not really worth competing for. In 
electricity supply they will be low income, provincial, or remote customers. 
Other countries have regulated to protect such customers from a market which 
was not interested in them. New Zealand has not. 
The second main difference is that the rest of the world have matched their 
reforms more closely to the unique market concerned. Electricity supply is 
unique. Demand is virtually constant but the wholesale price changes on a half-
hourly basis and transmission charges can vary dramatically.298 In market 
terms, the industry is characterised by high production and delivery costs and 
very low retail margins. The real savings come from a robustly competitive 
generation sector; and secondarily through regulated transmission and 
distribution charges. Some savings can also come from genuine retail 
competition, although only when cost-effective technology is implemented. 
Even so, retailing is not a generally profitable activity. 
296 The duopoly generators in England and Wales are a good example. For a paper arguing this 
proposition, see Trebilcock and Gal, above n 150. 
297 J Bridgman, Director-General of Fair Trading (United Kingdom) "The Appropriate Roles of 
the Different Regulators and Regulatory Bodies" (I O February 1997), I at 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/research/sp-arch/sp-utily.htm> (last accessed 29 May 1999). 
298 New Zealand has 244 differently priced transmission "nodes" over the country. 
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Finally, there is the New Zealand context. Electricity systems across the world 
are all different. They differ largely on area and terrain, weather, population 
levels and density, and the location and type of generation. New Zealand has a 
huge area for its population size. Many people are widely spread out in small 
clusters and the variety of challenging terrain and weather is well known. None 
of these things were mentioned in any relevant pre-EIR Act report on the 
ownership split. Nor were the structures, usually community-owned 
companies, which supplied the more difficult to reach and less profitable 
customers. 
Treating electricity as a generic product lacks regulatory sophistication. By 
doing so, the government missed three crucial points. Firstly, genuine savings 
were available through regulating transmission and distribution charges. This 
was not done. Secondly, by contrast, retail margins comprised a small part of 
the overall bill. A costly upheaval to make retail competition marginally 
smoother was never likely to "see electricity bills come down for all New 
Zealanders" . 299 Thirdly, community-ownership clearly protected rural 
customers far better than "competition" from large, profit-driven, genrets was 
ever going to. 
The result, as is clear, were reforms which were not tailored to the New Zealand 
electricity industry, but were basically the application of crude ideology. 
Competition is the basis for electricity regulation world-wide. However, the 
unique problems of market failure must be also addressed. The tragedy is that 
New Zealand could so easily have had the best of both worlds. It could have 
had robust retail competition for all consumers and allowed potential 
competitors to include community-owned companies. The only change to the 
reform package would have been the absence of the ownership split. Instead 
the split allowed large SOE and private companies to easily acquire all New 
Zealand domestic consumers without having to compete against the 
incumbents. 
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The government pushed ahead with the split in the face of a wealth of contrary 
advice. Its reasoning indicates that it understood the electricity industry only 
as an abstract economic construct. The striking similarity of the 1998 
electricity reforms to other New Zealand reforms since 1984, such as the 1993 
health reforms, suggests that the government was trying to make the facts fit the 
I 
theory rather than examining the facts themselves. 300 The results of the 
ownership split illustrate the fallacy of this approach. In a supreme irony, the 
split has proven to be a thoroughly anti-competitive device. The costs of 
separation appear to have effectively cancelled any benefits of competition for 
domestic customers. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The ownership split ended an era which began early this century. This was the 
partnership between local communities and the State which enabled the 
development of New Zealand's electricity supply system. 
The split also destroyed the 1992 re-invention of this concept: the community-
owned company. This is unfortunate. As successful SOEs have shown, the 
commercial nous of a company is dictated by its management; not its ownership 
structure. The relevant statistics confirmed this. Until the split, it seemed that 
provincial communities had cracked the problem of how to keep low provincial 
prices in an era of high profitability and user-pays. The new solution 1s 
protection by raw market forces. Time will judge the wisdom of this change. 
299 
Hon M Bradford "Electricity Reforms - A Better Deal For Consumers", Media Release, 23 
June 1998, I. 
300 
The health reforms were also based on separating the product (public health care) from its 
delivery by introducing competition among "providers" (including public hospitals and private 
entities) for limited funds distributed by Crown "purchasers". The reforms abolished area 
health boards (similar in concept to electric power boards); established four Regional Health 
Authorities as purchasers (but later replaced them with a single funding authority); and initially 
corporatised public hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises which were legal companies (this 
was relaxed in 1998). See generally the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 (and its 1995 
and 1998 amendments); and the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) Act 1993. 
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However other problems loom. From 1992, no supplier was required to supply 
any consumer; and from 2013, no lines company will be required to offer line 
services to any consumer. Problems will arise when supply and lines 
companies decide that some customers are simply too expensive to bother with. 
Whatever happens, it seems that with the demise of community companies, 
there is little option open to the government now but to ignore such problems or 
deal with them by direct heavy-handed regulation. 
It is hoped that future problems will be approached with sound evidence, advice 
which is heeded, and less ideology than the 1998 reforms. Utility reforms are 
not abstract theories, but real changes that crucially affect all New Zealanders 
and their communities. New Zealand has a right to demand that they are well 
thought out. 
APPENDIX ONE 
Methodology for comparing the performance of community-owned 
electricity companies to non community-owned electricity companies 
IV 
1. The facts about the total number of electricity companies and their 
ownership structures came from Carolyn Wylie New Zealand Electricity 
Directory (Chameleon Enterprises, Wellington) for the years 1993 -
1998 ("Electricity Directory"). 
2. The data for the performance of these companies came from the 
information disclosed under the Electricity (Information Disclosure) 
Regulations 1994 (introduced pursuant to section 170 of the Electricity 
Act 1992) for the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 ("Disclosure 
Statistics"). This is conveniently complied in a Ministry of Commerce 
publication: Electricity Information Disclosure Statistics 1998 (Ministry 
of Commerce, Wellington, November 1998), available at 
<http: //www.moc.govt.nz/ers/inf disc/disclosure 1998/disclosure12.ht - -
ml#P237 1519>. 
3. The only relevant difference between the two sources was that the 
Disclosure Statistics did not include two small electricity companies: 
Kaiapoi (leased to Mainpower); and, from 1998, Citipower (when it was 
sold to TransAlta). These were counted as separate entities in the 
Electricity Directory. As the performance data came from the 
Disclosure Statistics, I followed this methodology. 
4. Accordingly, all calculations assume the following total number of 
electricity companies in New Zealand following the Energy Companies 
Act 1992: 
1993 45 
1994 44 
1995 43 (without Kaiapoi) 
1996 40 (without Kaiapoi) 
1997 38 (without Kaiapoi) 
1998 35 (without Kaiapoi and Citipower) 
5. For the research, companies were classified as 100% community-owned 
("Community Companies") and other ("Other Companies"). The first 
group includes both trusts and community co-operatives provided full 
ownership remained in the local community or in current consumers. 
V 
6. The process was generally straightforward. Only three decisions need 
explaining. Mercury Energy Ltd, (now Vector Energy Ltd) was and is 
100% trust-owned. However it is counted as an Other Company for 
three reasons: 
(1) Mercury's trust is short-term and it was always expected that 
Mercury would be privately-owned eventually; 
(2) Mercury was New Zealand's largest EC and operated in New 
Zealand's largest metropolitan area; and 
(3) Mercury was renowned for its private company ethos and focus 
on high investor-style profits. 
In short, unlike all of the other Community Companies, Mercury was 
not the type of provincial or rural company the EIR Act was designed to 
eliminate. Mercury was excluded to meaningfully test the 
Government's theory that community companies were less efficient than 
more ' commercially oriented' companies. 
7. The second decision was to include Wairoa Power as a Community 
Company, even though in 1997 the Wairoa Electric Power Trust sold 
down from a 100% to a 60% shareholding. Wairoa was 100% trust-
owned from 1993 to mid-1997. 
8. The third decision was to count The Power Company as an Other 
Company even though it is now 100% trust-owned. This is because 
until 1998, the Power Company was Government-owned (the only 
electricity company so owned). 
9. All figures calculated (stated in Appendix Three) are the mean of the 
relevant statistic. 
10. The number of Other Companies changed between 1995 and 1998 due 
to mergers and acquisitions. What follows are lists of Community and 
Other companies for the four years. 
Community Companies (1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998) 
1. Buller Electricity 11. Marlborough Electric 
2. Central Electric 12. Northpower 
3. Central Hawkes Bay 13. Otago Power 
Power 14. Scanpower 
4. Counties Power 15. Tasman Energy 
5. Eastland Energy 16. Top Energy 
6. Horowhenua Energy 17. Waipa Power 
(also known as Electra) 18. Wairoa Power 
7. Electricity Ashburton 19. Waitaki Power 
8. Hawkes Bay Power 20. Waitomo Energy 
9. King Country Energy 21. Westpower 
10. Main power 
Other Companies (1995) Other Companies (1996) 
1. Alpine Energy 1. Alpine Energy 
2. Bay of Plenty 2. Bay of Plenty 
3. Capital Power 3. Capital Power 
4. Central Power 4. Central Power 
5. Dunedin Electricity 5. Dunedin Electricity 
6. Egmont Electricity 6. Egmont Electricity 
7. Electricity Invercargill 7. Electricity lnvercargill 
8. Electro Power 8. Electro Power 
9. Energy Direct 9. Energy Direct 
10. Mercury Energy 10. Mercury Energy 
11. Citipower (also known 11. Citipower (also known 
as Nelson Electricity) as Nelson Electricity) 
12. Power New Zealand 12. Power New Zealand 
13. Powerco 13. Powerco 
14. Rotorua Electricity 14. South power 
15. Southpower 15. Tauranga Electricity 
16. Taranaki Energy 16. The Power Company 
17. Taupo Electricity 17. Trustpower 
18. Tauranga Electricity 18. Wairarapa Electricity 
19. The Power Company 19. WEL Energy Group 
20. Trustpower 
21. Wairarapa Electricity 
22. WEL Energy Group 
Vll 
Other Companies (1997) Other Companies (1998) 
1. Alpine Energy 1. Alpine Energy 
2. Bay of Plenty 2. Bay of Plenty 
3. Central Power 3. Central Power 
4. Dunedin Electricity 4. Dunedin Electricity 
5. Egmont Electricity 5. Electricity Invercargill 
6. Electricity Invercargill 6. Mercury Energy 
7. Mercury Energy 7. Power New Zealand 
8. Citipower (also known 8. Powerco 
as Nelson Electricity) 9. Southpower 
9. Power New Zealand 10. The Power Company 
10. Powerco 11. TransAlta 
11. Southpower 12. Trustpower 
12. Tauranga Electricity _ 13. Wairarapa Electricity 
13. The Power Company 14. WEL Energy Group 
14. TransAlta 
15. Trustpower 
16. Wairarapa Electricity 
17. WEL Energy Group 
1995 Total (21 Community Companies+ 22 Other Companies)= 43 
1996 Total (21 Community Companies + 19 Other Companies)= 40 
1997 Total (21 Community Companies+ 17 Other Companies)= 38 
1998 Total (21 Community Companies+ 14 Other Companies)= 35 
ltfl'°PENICJ/ .,1' TWO viii 
Areas of supply at April 1998 
NORTH ISLAND ,-
No. AREA OF SUPPLY Sq km 
0 Top Energy 6830 
8 Northpower 5737 
E) Power NZ 10,048 
0 Mercury Energy 935 
0 Counties Power 2220 
0 WEL Energy Group 3088 
0 TrustPower 9158 
() Bay of Plenty 8388 
(i) Eastland Energy 8346 
~ Waipa Power 1864 
G) Waitomo Energy 6221 
® King Country Energy 7402 
® Wairoa Power 3512 
'° Hawke's Bay Power 4975 ® CHB Power Holdings 3367 
~ Powerco 15,975 
G CentralPower 6233 
~ ScanPower 2103 
~ Walrarapa Electricity 5753 
® Horowhenua Energy (Electra) 1628 
® TransAlta NZ 1238 
New Zealand Electricity Directory 1998 
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SOUTH ISLAND 
No. AREA OF SUPPLY Sq km 
® Marlborough Electric 11 ,272 
e Cltipower 24 
® Tasman Energy 10,799 
~ Buller Electricity 4645 
® Westpower 18,017 
® MainPower 12,320 
~ Kaiapoi Electricity 4 
ED South power 8018 
~ Electricity Ashburton 6664 
~ Alpine Energy 10 ,596 
~ Waitaki Power 7741 
e Central Electric 18,750 
e Otago Power 12,349 
~ Dunedin Electricity 1101 
0 The Power Company 28,740 
w Electricity lnvercargill 33 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Tables of Statistics 
PROFIT A 
I Accounting Return on Assets (per cent) 
1995 1996 
Community 4.00 4.62 
Companies 
Other 7.48 8.47 
Companies 
2 Accounting Return on Equity (per cent) 
1995 1996 
lX 
1997 1998 
4.83 4.89 
9.48 10.29 
1997 1998 -
Community 2.99 3.39 3.50 3.65 
Companies 
Other 5.53 6.18 6.49 7.40 
Companies 
3 Accounting Rate of Profit (per cent) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Community 3.06 4.25 4.67 13.92 
Companies 
Other 5.15 5.83 10.90 7.96 
Companies 
*The 1997 ,md 1998 m~ans hc::ve been distorted by ODV revaluations, see main pape,·, n 219. 
B PRlCING 
4 Domestic Delivered Prices (cents per Kilowatt Hour) 
I Size -
--
1995 1996 
s M L s M L - ---- - .. 
Community 13.65 11.67 i 1.01 13.89 12.00 11 .45 
Companies 
--
Other 13.82 11.92 11.27 14.01 12.39 _J 11.78 
Companies 
--
1997 1998 --- - M ---~ L Size s M L s 
Community 13.88 12.09 11.52 13.98 12.28 11.69 
Companies 
·------
Other 14.31 12.76 12.11 14.46 17 .. 91 
Companies 
* S = Small domestic customer, M = Medium domestic customer, L = Laq~e domestic 
customer. All prices arc inflation adjusted. 
12.24 
EFFICIENCY C 
5 Direct Line Costs per Kilometre (expenditure {in dollars J directly 
relating to lines divided by total system length) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Community 1271.39 1161.86 1195.68 1147.96 
Companies 
Other 2356.51 2122.45 1884.18 1669.64 
Companies 
6 Indirect Line Costs per Customer (in dollars) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Community 99.57 97.37 101.60 90.14 
Companies 
Other 131.52 121.29 115.00 94.47 
Companies 
7 Load Factor (efficient utilisation of lines) 
1997 1998 
Community 60.21 61.23 
Companies 
Other 57.73 60.80 
Companies 
*Statistics only provided for 1997 and 1998. 
8 Lines Loss Ratio (percentage of total electricity lost in.financial year) 
1997 1998 
Community 6.96 6.95 
Companies 
Other 5.60 5.81 
Companies 
*Statistics only provided for 1997 and 1998. 
9 Total Number of Interruptions 
1997 1998 
Community 421.14 383.95 
Companies 
Other 562.76 616.71 
Companies 
*Statistics only provided for 1997 and 1998. 
X 
XI 
10 Number of Faults Over 100km of Line 
1997 1998 
Community 11.69 9.83 
Companies 
Other 12.14 10.44 
Companies 
*Statistics only provided for 1997 and 1998. 
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Government Policy Papers and Abbreviations 
Cabinet Committee Papers 
Xll 
1. "Electricity Reforms: Paper 1: Overview", 1 December 1997, CIE (97) 
192 ["Cabinet Committee One"]. 
2. "Electricity Reforms: Paper 2: Analysis of Problems", 1 December 
1997, CIE (97) 193 ["Cabinet Committee Two"]. 
3. "Electricity Reforms: Paper 3: Options for Generation", 1 December 
1997, CIE (97) 194 ["Cabinet Committee Three"]. 
4. "Electricity Reforms: Paper 4: Options for Electricity Distribution and 
Retailing", 1 December 1997, CIE (97) 195 ["Cabinet Committee 
Four"]. 
5. "Electricity Reforms: Paper 5: Implementation Issues for Generation", 1 
December 1997, CIE (97) 196 ["Cabinet Committee Five"]. 
6. "Electricity Reform Proposals", 2 December 1997, CIE (97) M 35/13-
17 ["Cabinet Committee Six"]. 
7. "Electricity Reforms", 4 December 1997, CIE (97) M 3 6/1-5 ["Cabinet 
Committee Seven"]. 
8. "Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations: Proposed 
Amendments", 13 February 1998, ECO (98) 1 ["Cabinet Committee 
Eight"]. 
9. "Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations: Proposed 
Amendments", 18 February 1998, ECO (98)Ml/3 ["Cabinet Committee 
Nine"]. 
10. "Electricity Corporation New Zealand Break-up: Implementation 
Issues", 23 March 1998, ECO (98) 33 ["Cabinet Committee 1 O"]. 
11. "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform", 23 March 1998, ECO (98) 
31 ["Cabinet Committee 11 "]. 
12. "Electricity Corporation New Zealand Break-up: Structural Options", 
24 March 1998, ECO (98) 32 ["Cabinet Committee 12"]. 
13. "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform", 25 March 1998, ECO (98) 
M 5/1 ["Cabinet Committee 13 "]. 
Xlll 
14. "Electricity Corporation New Zealand Break-up: Structural Options", 25 
March 1998, ECO (98) M 5/2 ["Cabinet Committee 14"]. 
15. "Electricity Corporation New Zealand Break-up: Implementation 
Issues", 25 March 1998, ECO (98) M 5/3 ["Cabinet Committee 15"]. 
16. "ECNZ Restructuring: Appointment of Transition Team", 31 March 
1998, APH (98) 31 ["Cabinet Committee 16"]. 
17. "ECNZ Restructuring: Appointment of Transition Team", 6 April 1998, 
CAB (98) M 12/3D(l) ["Cabinet Committee 17"]. 
Cabinet Papers 
18. "Electricity Reform Proposals", 15 December 1997, CAB (97) M 47/33 
["Cabinet One"] . 
19. "Report of the Cabinet Economic Committee: Week Ended 20 February 
1998", 23 February 1998, CAB (98) M 6/7B ["Cabinet Two"]. 
20. "Report of the Cabinet Economic Committee: Week Ended 27 March 
1998", 30 March 1998, CAB (98) M 11/3D ["Cabinet Three"]. 
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Issues", 30 March 1998, CAB (98) Ml 1/3D(2) ["Cabinet Four"] . 
22. "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform", 30 March 1998, CAB (98) 
M 11 /3D(l) ["Cabinet Five"]. 
23 . "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform", 6 April 1998, CAB (98) M 
12/5 ["Cabinet Six"]. 
Papers from the Officials ' Committee on Energy Policy 
24. OCEP "Further Electricity Reforms: Next Steps", 5 August 1997 
["OCEP One"]. 
25 . OCEP "Electricity Reforms: Summary of Submissions", 29 August 
1997 ["OCEP Two"]. 
26. OCEP "Electricity Distribution Reforms: OCEP Briefing to Ministers", 
3 September 1997 ["OCEP Three"]. 
27. OCEP "Electricity: Distribution (Lines and Retail) Reform, 22 October 
1997 ["OCEP Four"]. 
28. OCEP "Electricity Distribution and Retail Sector Reform" (Briefing 
Paper), 24 October 1997 ["OCEP Five"]. 
29. OCEP "Electricity Reforms: Options for Electricity Distribution and 
Retailing", 1 December 1997 ["OCEP Six"]. 
30. OCEP "Proposed Timetable for Electricity Reforms", 18 December 
1997 ["OCEP Seven"]. 
XIV 
31. OCEP "Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform: Policy Options", 18 
February 1998 ["OCEP Eight"]. 
32. OCEP "Electricity Generation, Distribution and Retail Reform -
Follow-up Issues", 30 March 1998 ["OCEP Nine"]. 
33. Tony Baldwin (Chair of OCEP) "Electricity Distribution and Retail 
Reform: Key Issues", 17 March 1998 ["OCEP 10"]. 
34. OCEP "Draft Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform - Policy 
Options", 18 March 1998 ["OCEP 11 "]. 
Treasury Papers 
35. Treasury "Regulatory Issues in the Electricity Distribution and Retail 
Sectors", 28 August 1997 ["Treasury One"]. 
36. Treasury "Competition Issues in the Electricity Industry", Memorandum 
to Senior Management Group, 9 October 1997 ["Treasury Two"]. 
37. Treasury "Competition in the Electricity Retail and Distribution Sectors 
- Update", 21 October 1997 ["Treasury Three"]. 
38. Treasury "Ministers' Meeting on Electricity Reforms", 25 November 
1997 ["Treasury Four"]. 
39. Treasury "Competition Issues in the Electricity Industry", Memorandum 
to Senior Management Group, 17 February 1998 ["Treasury Five"]. 
40. Treasury "Security of Supply: Response to Sir Ron Carter's Questions", 
18 February 1998 ["Treasury Six"]. 
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Retailing Sectors", 2 March 1998 ["Treasury Seven"]. 
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Options: Key Issues", 18 March 1998 ["Treasury Eight"]. 
43. Treasury "Electricity Reform Package", 24 March 1998 ["Treasury 
Nine"]. 
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of Price Control", 27 March 1998 ["Treasury 10"]. 
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48. Treasury "Telecommunications Regulations - Comparison to 
Electricity", 5 June 1998 ["Treasury 14"]. 
49. Treasury "Separation of Electricity Distribution and Energy 
Businesses", 9 June 1998 ["Treasury 15"]. 
50. Treasury, Draft Parliamentary Question for Oral Answer, 16 June 1998 
["Treasury 16"]. 
51. Treasury, Letter to J Small, Director of the Centre for Research in 
Network Economics and Communications, 17 July 1998 ["Treasury 
17"]. 
Ministry of Commerce Papers 
52. Commerce "Discussion Note on Metering and Profiling", 3 October 
1997 ["Commerce One"]. 
53. Commerce "NZIER Metering and Profiling: Competition for Small 
Electricity Consumers", 3 October 1997 ["Commerce Two"]. 
54. Commerce "Magnitude of Regulatory Problems in Electricity 
Distribution and Retailing", 21 November 1997 ["Commerce Three"]. 
55. Commerce "Background Material and Options for Increasing Efficiency 
in Electricity Distribution and Retailing", 4 December 1997 
["Commerce Four"]. 
56. Commerce "Electricity Market Reform: Review of Submissions on 
Metering and Profiling", 23 December 1997 ["Commerce Five"]. 
57. Commerce "Electricity Distribution and Reform - Policy Options", 18 
March 1998 ["Commerce Six"]. 
Papers by Minister of Energy 
58. Hon M Bradford "Energy: Key Issues", 15 October 1997 ["Energy: Key 
Issues"]. 
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Hon W Peters, Rt Hon WF Birch, Hon Jenny Shipley, 23 October 1997 
["Future Directions"]. 
60. Hon M Bradford "Paper 1: Electricity Distribution and Retail Reform" 
20 March 1998 ["Paper l "]. 
Consultants ' Reports 
61. J Culy, NZIER "Comments on Electricity Competition and the Likely 
Outcomes From a Further Separation ofECNZ", November 1997 
["Culy Comments One"]. 
62. J Culy, NZIER "Comments on a Compromise Two Way Split 
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63. Eden Resources Ltd "Environmental Impacts of Possible Electricity 
Reforms", 19 December 1997 ["Environmental Impacts"]. 
64. McKinlay Douglas Limited "Retail Competition", September 1997 
["McKinlay Douglas"]. 
65. NZIER "Metering and Profiling: Competition for Small Electricity 
Consumers", September 1997 ["Metering and Profiling"]. 
66. Turner & Murray "Competition in Electricity Generation - Options for a 
Further Slit of ECNZ", August 1997 ["Generation Competition"]. 
67. Turner & Murray "Security of Supply in a Competitive Electricity 
Market", December 1997 ["Security of Supply"]. 
ECNZ 
68. ECNZ "Response to Electricity Industry Review", 11 December 1997 
["Response to Review"]. 
Government Media Releases 
69. Hon W Peters, Rt Hon B Birch, Hon M Bradford "A Better Deal for 
Electricity Consumers", Media Release, 7 April 1998 ["A Better Deal 
for Electricity Consumers"]. 
70. Hon W Peters, Hon M Bradford "Electricity Distribution and Retail 
Reforms", Media Release, 7 April 1998 ["Electricity Distribution and 
Retail Reforms"]. 
71. Hon M Bradford "UK Also Moves to Power Company Ownership 
Separation" Media Release, 21 June 1998 ["UK Also Moves"]. 
72. 
XVll 
Hon M Bradford "Electricity Reforms - A Better Deal For Consumers", 
Media Release, 23 June 1998, 1 ["A Better Deal (Two)"]. 
73. Statistics New Zealand "Quarterly New Zealand Energy Statistics -
June 1999 quarter" Media Release, 1 September 1999 ["Quarterly New 
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